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ARTICLE 
 
CHARM CITY TELEVISED & DEHUMANIZED: HOW CCTV 
BAIL REVIEWS VIOLATE DUE PROCESS 
 
By:1 Edie Fortuna Cimino,2 Zina Makar,3 and Natalie Novak4 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
n May 28, 2013, Torrey Johnson5 struggles to raise both his hands, 
handcuffed and seated shoulder-to-shoulder between two other 
defendants in the first row of the closed circuit television (“CCTV” or 
“videoconference”) bail review hearing room within the Baltimore Central 
Booking and Intake Center (“Centeral Booking”).  There are two more rows 
of defendants behind Mr. Johnson, all in yellow jumpsuits, being watched by 
correctional officers.  Separated by a three-foot wall, Mr. Johnson’s public 
defender sits out of sight from the video camera’s field of view, about ten 
feet away from her client.  The judge quickly reads through Mr. Johnson’s 
rights.  A representative from the Pretrial Release Services Program 
(“Pretrial Release”) makes a recommendation that is broadcasted meekly 
from the courtroom.  As the judge looks down at his desk to take notes, Mr. 
Johnson looks down and shakes his head.  He disagrees with something the 
Pretrial Services representative said, and starts to speak.  No one seems to 
hear Mr. Johnson's voice in his own bail review hearing.  
     Mr. Johnson’s experience demonstrates the constitutional violations that 
many indigent defendants in Baltimore City disproportionately face as 
1 The views expressed herein are those held by the authors’ alone, and do not 
represent the position of the University of Baltimore Law Forum, its editorial board 
and staff, or any other entity. 
2 Deputy District Public Defender for District IV of Maryland (Calvert, Charles, and 
St. Mary's Counties); Office of the Public Defender in Baltimore (2003-2014); 
Judicial Clerk for the Honorable Albert J. Matricciani, Jr.; University of Maryland 
Francis King Carey School of Law, J.D.;  St. Mary's College of Maryland, 
B.A.  Edie is grateful for support from the coolest third grader in the world, Louie; 
the contagiously happy and wise William; a top-notch husband, father, and friend, 
Joe; and Nana, who consistently roots for freedom and redemption.  Thanks go to 
Joseph A. Fortuna, M.D., Brian Saccenti, Andrew Geraghty, Natalie Finegar, and 
Mary Denise Davis for their valuable assistance.  
3 Zina Makar, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, J.D. 2014; 
Open Society Institute 2014 - 2016 Baltimore City Community Fellow implementing 
a program with the Office of the Public Defender in Baltimore City to challenge 
wrongful bail determinations through State habeas corpus petitions.   
4 Natalie Novak graduated cum laude from the University of Baltimore School of 
Law in 2014.  She is currently an Apprentice Fellow at the Maryland Office of the 
Public Defender, Collateral Review Division.   
5 The defendant’s name has been changed to protect client confidentiality.  
O 
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Maryland conducts bail review hearings on a television screen, not in person.  
Speed and convenience are the driving factors behind the state’s decision to 
hold bail hearings through videoconference systems.  Mr. Johnson’s case is 
an example of the procedural problems raised when CCTV is used in bail 
review hearings, both in district and circuit courts.6    
     Many of Mr. Johnson’s rights were stripped away during his bail review 
hearing.  Denied the right to be physically present before a judge, Mr. 
Johnson’s face was grainy and unrecognizable, while his bright yellow 
jumpsuit fluoresced.  Separated from his attorney by correctional officers, he 
was unable to challenge the facts that the Pretrial Services representative 
presented against him.  He was disoriented without the guidance of his 
attorney, who should have been within a whisper’s distance.  In less than two 
minutes, Mr. Johnson, unable to make the $50,000 bail, was denied the 
opportunity to be released before his case is decided.   
     By contrast, Carl Gibson7 was granted a bail review hearing in circuit 
court, the trial court for his felony charge, approximately six months after he 
was initially incarcerated.  He was physically present in the courtroom 
during his bail review hearing, accompanied by his attorney and his 
girlfriend, who was nine months pregnant at the time.  Mr. Gibson 
communicated with his attorney throughout the hearing, providing 
information to counter the representations made by Pretrial Services.  His 
attorney made arguments regarding his ties to the community and the 
weakness of the case against him.  Ultimately, Mr. Gibson was granted a 
substantial reduction in money bail.    
     This article will discuss CCTV bail hearings that take place in district and 
circuit courts.  First, using Baltimore City as a case study, we will detail the 
importance of pretrial release for trial outcomes and how lengthy pretrial 
incarceration disproportionately affects both the poor and African-American 
population.  We will then argue that CCTV violates a defendant’s right to be 
physically present within a courtroom, his Sixth Amendment right to 
confront the witnesses against him, and his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.  These constitutional violations, when combined, deprive defendants 
of their liberty without the due process of law.    
 
I. RIGHT AGAINST EXCESSIVE BAIL 
 
6 See Md. R. 4-231 (permitting the use of videoconference systems in bail review 
hearings that are held in district court). From August 2013 to submission of this 
article for publication, bail review hearings and petitions for writs of habeas corpus 
were being conducted in circuit court via CCTV.  Any use of CCTV equipment in 
bail review hearings before the Circuit Court for Baltimore City is not permitted by 
the express language of Maryland Rule 4-231.  
7 The defendant’s name has been changed to protect client confidentiality. 
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A. Lengthy Pretrial Incarceration Disproportionately Affects the Poor 
and African-American Population 
 
     In Ake v. Oklahoma, Justice Marshall stated that “justice cannot be equal 
where, simply as a result of his poverty, a defendant is denied the 
opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which his 
liberty is at stake.”8  Justice Marshall’s words are strikingly relevant to the 
effects that CCTV has on indigent defendants in Baltimore City, where 
pretrial detainees are overwhelmingly African-American and poor.9  Surety 
bail amounts are acutely significant to poor defendants.10  When money for 
food and rent is unsure, the extra expense of paying bail to a corporate 
bondsman will be an extreme hardship.11  In most situations, bail is paid by 
the detainee’s friends and family.  For the multigenerational poor, when the 
bail amount skyrockets into the hundreds of thousands, or even millions, of 
dollars, freedom is out of reach.12  Although loved ones may dearly want to 
bring a detainee home, the money is just not there.13  To an affluent 
8 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985). 
9 See Nastassia Walsh, Baltimore Behind Bars, JUSTICE POLICY INST. 15 (2010), 
available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-
06_rep_baltbehindbars_md-ps-ac-rd.pdf (almost ninety percent of Baltimore City 
detainees are African-American).  See also Douglas L. Colbert et. al., Do Attorneys 
Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1721 (2002) (lower income defendants tend to be 
disproportionately African-American); Exectuive Summary to THE PRETRIAL 
RELEASE PROJECT: A STUDY OF MARYLAND’S PRETRIAL RELEASE AND BAIL 
SYSTEM, ABELL FOUND. ii n.5 (Sept. 12, 2001) (hereinafter “ABELL FOUND.”), 
available at 
http://www.abell.org/sites/default/files/publications/hhs_pretrial_9.01%281%29.pdf 
(“Seventy percent of interviewed arrestees for this Study reported that the expense of 
the bondsmen’s fee would result in a delay paying rent and utilities and in buying 
less food.”). 
10 NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, NAPSA STANDARDS ON PRETRIAL 
RELEASE 18 (3d ed. 2004), available at 
http://www.napsa.org/publications/2004napsastandards.pdf (stating surety bail 
systems “discriminate unfairly against the poor and middle-class persons who cannot 
afford the non-refundable (and often very high) fees that the bondsman requires as a 
condition of posting the bond”).  
11 See ABELL FOUND., supra note 9. See also Walsh, supra note 9.  
12 In advocating for the abolition of compensated sureties, the National Association 
of Pretrial Services Agencies notes “[t]here is no reason to require defendants to 
support bail bondsmen in order to obtain release (and to pay the bondsman a fee that 
is not refundable even if they are ultimately cleared of the charges) . . . .”  See NAT’L 
ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 19. 
13 See BRIAN A. REAVES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE 
URBAN COUNTIES: 1994, (1998), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc94.pdf (study demonstrating the inverse 
relationship between increasing bail amounts and the decreasing probability of 
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defendant, the dollar amount of bail is less significant.14  To avoid spending 
even one night in Central Booking, most would consider paying a hefty sum 
well worth it.15   
     Unfortunately, a defendant’s ability to pay bail is rarely taken into 
account by judges.  Typically, a “reasonable bail” is assessed solely on the 
allegations, a defendant’s criminal history, and his ties to the community.16  
However, under Stack v. Boyle,17 the amount set for bail should be no more 
than is necessary to assure the defendant’s presence at trial.  Bail is collateral 
to ensure court appearances, and should not be punishment for crimes yet to 
be proven.  The same dollar amount will be more important to recoup for an 
indigent defendant than an affluent one; as such, indigence itself should be a 
factor in favor of lower bail.18  Because this connection often escapes 
recognition,19 it is all the more important that indigent defendants are granted 
the full spectrum of their rights during bail review hearings.20  
release). See also BRIAN A. REAVES & PHENY Z. SMITH, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES: 1992 (1995), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=4120. 
14 See Executive Summary to ABELL FOUND., supra note 9, at v n.15 (“According to 
the 1995 national census, the median ([fiftieth] percentile) income for the typical 
household in Baltimore ($42,021), Frederick ($51,220), Harford (48,467) and Prince 
George’s ($45,281) counties was 75 to 100% higher than for Baltimore City 
($25,918) . . . .  Consequently, the same dollar amount is likely to represent a greater 
financial hardship for individuals and families in Baltimore City.”). 
15 See Sadhbh Walshe, America’s Bail System: One Law for the Rich, Another for 
the Poor, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2013), 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/14/america-bail-system-law-
rich-poor (“Until we have the courage to change it, we should at least call bail by its 
real name: a get-out-of-jail pass for those who can pay, and jail-time for those who 
can't.”). 
16 See Cynthia Jones, Give Us Free: Addressing Racial Disparities in Bail 
Determinations, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 919, 935 (2013). 
17 Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 5 (1951).  
18 See United States v. McConnell, 842 F.2d 105, 107 (5th Cir. 1988). See also State 
ex rel. Bardina v. Sandstrom, 321 So. 2d 630, 631 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); 
Mendenhall v. Sweat, 158 So. 280, 281-82 (Fla. 1934) (stating that a defendant’s 
financial condition must be considered when instating a bail amount required to 
assure the presence of the defendant). 
19 During a bail review hearing on May 28, 2013, after argument by defense counsel, 
Edie Cimino, that the defendant could not post the set amount of money bail, the 
judge noted that the duty to set a reasonable bail, does not impose upon a judge a 
duty  to consider what bail amount the defendant could make. 
20 Ronnie Thaxton, Injustice Telecast: The Illegal Use of Closed-Circuit Television 
Arraignments and Bail Bond Hearings in Federal Court, 79 IOWA L. REV. 175, 197-
98 (1993) (“Criminal defendants, especially minorities, often feel they are 
‘outsiders’ rather than participants in the adjudication of justice. Given the reality 
that most racial minorities, especially Blacks, may already distrust and feel 
intimidated by the criminal justice system, CC[TV]s provide another bar to their full 
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Videoconference bail review hearings forsake the rights of the poor in the 
name of convenience and efficiency.  
 
B. Importance of Pretrial Release for Trial Outcomes 
 
     When an accused is incarcerated prior to his trial, he is held for a crime of 
which he is presumed innocent, and forced to live in squalid conditions that 
are worse than those where convicted criminals are held.21  Pretrial 
incarceration involves sleep deprivation, shockingly unsanitary conditions, 
and violence.22  A defendant’s countenance and posture will reflect those 
experiences and convey a message to the court and jurors.  The state system 
has determined that he is guilty enough to keep locked up, and he wears that 
badge of guilt when presented to the court via video during various pretrial 
proceedings.23 
understanding of the proceedings and reinforce their distrust of the system. CC[TV]s 
only further magnify this distrust and alienation.”). 
21 Jonathan Zweig, Extraordinary Conditions of Release Under the Bail Reform Act, 
47 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 555, 556 (2010) (citing Pugh v. Rainwater, 557 F.2d 1189, 
1198 (5th Cir. 1977) (“[I]n a system that prides itself on a devotion to ‘equal justice 
under the law’, [sic] it is difficult to maintain that conditions common in pretrial 
detention centers do not punish defendants presumed innocent but that the more 
wholesome conditions of minimum security prisons do punish convicted criminals.”) 
(citations omitted) (quoting another source)).  
22 James MacArthur, Jailed Journalist Reports Inhumane Conditions for Pre-Trial 
Detainees, INDYPENDENT READER (Apr. 29, 2013), 
https://indyreader.org/content/court-date-jailed-journalist-reports-inhumane-
conditions-pre-trial-detainees.   
23 See MICHAEL J. KELLY & EFREM LECY, MAKING THE “SYSTEM” WORK IN THE 
BALTIMORE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: AN EVALUATION OF EARLY DISPOSITION 
COURT 13 (2002), available at 
http://msa.maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/004000/0046
07/unrestricted/20071518e.pdf (“The defendant threatens to burden the court with a 
jury trial in order to negotiate a more favorable outcome through a plea bargain. 
The prosecutor seeks to game the system as well, through increasing the penalties at 
each new stage in the process, in order to negotiate a more severe penalty for the 
defendant for burdening the system”).  See also Commonwealth v. Bethea, 379 A.2d 
102, 105 n.8 (Pa. 1977) (“Judge David Bazelon, speaking for the Court of Appeals 
for the District of Columbia, has suggested the shortcomings of these contentions: 
‘Repentance has a role in penology. But the premise of our criminal jurisprudence 
has always been that the time for repentance comes after trial. The adversary process 
is a fact-finding engine, not a drama of contrition in which a prejudged defendant is 
expected to knit up his lacerated bonds to society.’”).  See also Steven P. Grossman, 
An Honest Approach to Plea Bargaining, 29 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 101 (2005) 
(proposing a solution for and argues that differential sentencing of criminal 
defendants who plead guilty and those that go to trial is a punishment for the 
defendants exercising their right to trial). 
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     At the most basic level, a defendant’s decision-making process is fueled 
by his traumatic experience in jail.  In pretrial detention the defendant has 
gone sleepless, unshowered, and scared for months.  These conditions 
present the defendant with an added incentive to plead guilty and accept a 
sentence certain to result in his transfer to a classified institution.24  There the 
defendant can begin to count down the days to freedom.  This certainty 
brings a defendant relative peace of mind and ends the waiting, fearing the 
worst, and hoping for finality.  
     While incarcerated, the accused cannot fully participate in preparing his 
defense for trial.  The defendant is unable to investigate his case, do legal 
research, or even call his lawyer at a time of his choosing.25  He can read 
only what is provided to him and he cannot assist in locating witnesses.26  
Rather, he must wait for his attorney to visit him and, when she does, 
chances are their meeting will not be confidential.27  From his cell, the 
defendant cannot assist in finding witnesses or accompany his lawyer on 
crime scene investigations to show her where the incident occurred.  Often 
times, a client can educate their lawyer about the particular locations, such as 
alleyways, backyards, and hangout spots, that are the subjects of the police 
reports; however, without the defendant’s presence, the attorney must often 
rely on guesswork and a hand-drawn map from her client.28  Finding 
witnesses is not always an exact science.  For example, an accused may 
know that there was a lady on her porch who saw the event, but not know her 
name, address, or phone number.  While the accused may recognize her face 
or her house, the lawyer does not.   
24 KELLY & LECY, supra note 23, at 13.   
25 Interview with the Honorable Robert Cooper, J., Baltimore City District Court 
(June 12, 2013) (Judge Cooper acknowledged that some witnesses in “Baltimore 
City are very transient.”  In the district court a trial must occur within thirty days of 
arrest.  Judge Cooper noted that this is a very limited time frame.  If a defendant is 
not on the streets looking for his potential witness because the defendant does not 
make bail and remains incarcerated pending trial, then “[the defendant] will never 
get him.”). 
26 Id. 
27 Jack Rubin, Letter to the Editor, Central Booking and Jail are Failing, BALT. SUN 
(Aug. 7, 2012), available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-08-07/news/bs-
ed-jail-letter-20120807_1_deplorable-conditions-baltimore-city-detention-center-
interviews.  
28 NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10 (“Upon a showing by 
defense counsel of compelling necessity, including for matters related to preparation 
of the defendant’s case, a judicial officer who entered an order of pretrial 
detention . . . may permit the temporary release of a pretrial detained person to the 
custody of a law enforcement or other court officer . . . [t]he burden is clearly on the 
defense to prove the need for such release, which may be for matters relating to 
preparation of the defendant’s case (for example, a site visit to a particular location, 
providing an opportunity to review the scene with counsel) . . . .”). 
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     If a defendant is convicted after trial, the State’s sentencing 
recommendation, and the one actually imposed, will be considerably higher 
than if he were to accept a plea.29  Nearly every time a guilty verdict is 
rendered, a “trial tax” is imposed by the sentencing judge.  This is, in part, 
due to the legislature’s enactment of various mandatory penalties that take 
away judicial discretion, which the prosecutor may unilaterally invoke.30  It 
is also partly due to the personal and philosophical beliefs held by some 
members of the bench, and may be an attempt to discourage jury trials to 
prevent overcrowding an already crowded docket.  Whatever the reason, a 
defendant is not likely to gamble with his liberty by demanding a jury trial.31   
     In addition to the pressures to plead guilty, applicable to all defendants, 
pretrial incarceration creates further inducements for an accused to give up 
his trial rights.32  Several studies have demonstrated that “released 
defendants tend to fare far better than those who are held in detention.”33  
Specifically, research shows that those “detained in jail while awaiting trial 
plead guilty more often, are convicted more often, are sentenced to prison 
more often, and receive harsher prison sentences than those who are released 
during the pretrial period.”34  Put another way, those who are not jailed 
pending trial have much more favorable outcomes.35   
29 KELLY & LECY, supra note 23, at 12. 
30 For example, fourth time drug offenders are subject to a forty-year mandatory 
minimum if they have previously served three or more separate terms of 
confinement as a result of three or more separate convictions.  See generally 
Grossman, supra note 23, at 110–15. 
31 See Grossman, supra note 23, at 101 (citations omitted) (“The process by which 
criminal convictions come about through guilty pleas in exchange for sentencing 
considerations carries with it the almost inevitable result that those who refuse a plea 
bargain are punished for exercising the right to trial. This punishment for exercising 
the right to trial, and the deterrent impact that such a punishment creates for criminal 
defendants considering whether to go to trial, take place not in rare instances but in 
the overwhelming number of cases disposed of in federal and state criminal court 
systems.”). 
32 See Walshe, supra note 15 (quoting NORMAN REIMER, EXEC. DIR., NAT’L ASS’N 
FOR CRIM. DEF. LAWYERS (“Bail is used as ransom to extract a guilty plea. Fact.”)). 
33 See NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 9 (“Deprivation 
of liberty pending trial . . . subjects the defendant to economic and psychological 
hardship, interferes with their ability to defend themselves, and, in many 
circumstances, deprives their families of support.”). 
34 KRISTIN BECHTEL ET AL., DISPELLING THE MYTHS: WHAT POLICY MAKERS NEED 
TO KNOW ABOUT PRETRIAL RESEARCH, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST. (2012), available at 
http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-
reports/Dispelling%20the%20Myths%20(November%202012).pdf.  See NAT’L 
ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10; Stevens H. Clarke & Susan T. 
Kurtz, The Importance of Interim Decisions to Felony Trial Court Dispositions, 74 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 476, 503, 505 (1983) (A study of urban felony cases in 
North Carolina “measured the effects of pretrial detention, controlling for 
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II. THE CASE STUDY: BALTIMORE CITY 
 
A. The Long Road to Circuit Court for a Felony Case 
 
     An individual faced with the unlucky experience of being arrested in 
Baltimore City is physically presented to a district court commissioner for a 
one-on-one interview within twenty-four hours of their arrest.36  Initially, 
bail is set by a commissioner, who is appointed by the Chief Judge of the 
District Court of Maryland, but who is not necessarily a judge herself.37  The 
commissioner communicates with the defendant through a glass partition in 
Central Booking, and decides whether to set bail, and if so, the appropriate 
monetary value.38   
seriousness of charge, prior convictions, evidence against the defendant, and other 
variables that might possibly affect both pretrial detention and court disposition . . . .  
[T]he regression analysis [shows] that when two defendants and their cases were 
alike, but one defendant spent more time in pretrial detention than the other, the 
former defendant was less likely to have his charges dismissed than the latter and 
was also more likely to receive a stiffer sentence if convicted.”); JOHN S. 
GOLDKAMP, TWO CLASSES OF ACCUSED: STUDY OF BAIL AND DETENTION IN 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 199 (1979) (In a multivariate regression analysis, the author 
found a “rather pronounced relationship between defendants’ pretrial statuses and 
their sentences . . . .”  The study included 8,171 defendants in Philadelphia. Of those 
who were convicted, whether in jail or out, 60% were placed on probation or given 
other non-jail sentences, while 26% of those who were detained until conviction 
were spared jail sentences.). 
35 See Walshe, supra note 15 (quoting Robin Steinberg, Executive Director of the 
Bronx Defenders: “If they have you in jail, the power has shifted to the prosecutorial 
arm of the system, and they can force you to make a plea. If you are out of jail, the 
power dynamic is completely different. Our research shows that when bail is posted, 
at least half the cases are going to be dismissed outright and most will result in no 
jail time at all. This is why prosecutors fight so desperately for bail.”).  
36 See Press Release, Md. Dep’t of Pub. Safety and Corr. Servs., Public Defender’s 
Office Drops Suit Against Central Booking and Intake Center: Agency 
Acknowledges “24-hour rule” Violations Virtually Eliminated (Sept. 15, 2006), 
available at http://dpscs.maryland.gov/publicinfo/pdfs/pressreleases/20060915.pdf 
(dismissing the Baltimore City Public Defender’s Office’s class action suit against 
Baltimore’s Central Booking and Intake Center for detaining arrestees for longer 
than twenty-four hours before seeing a commissioner).  
37 See ABELL FOUND., supra note 9, at n.75 (commissioners are not required to 
achieve legal degrees; more than three of four Commissioners interviewed stated that 
their legal training included a paralegal education; about 15% graduated from law 
school, and one of five commissioners had taken some law school courses). 
38 See Understanding the System, MD. OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEFENDER, 
http://www.opd.state.md.us/Districts/Dist1/YDUHome/ClientFamilyResources/FAQ
s.aspx (last visited Sept. 28, 2014). 
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     A charging document is issued to the defendant, which is frequently 
prepared by the Baltimore City Police Officer who made the on scene arrest 
and filed an affidavit describing the alleged illegal act.39  Thus, it is the 
arresting officer who initially decides what crimes to charge the defendant 
with, including whether they are misdemeanors or felonies.40  An individual 
could also be arrested because of a complaining witness’ sworn, handwritten 
claim alleging that the individual committed a crime.41  In that situation, a 
39 Unfortunately, there are several documented instances of alleged and confirmed 
dishonesty of members of the police force in Baltimore and nationally. See Michelle 
Alexander, Opinion, Why Police Lie Under Oath, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2013), 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/03/opinion/sunday/why-police-
officers-lie-under-oath.html?pagewanted=all.  See also Justin Fenton, Baltimore 
Police Officer Charged in Drug Corruption Case, BALT. SUN (May 31, 2013), 
available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-31/news/bs-md-ci-police-
corruption-indictment-20130531_1_drug-dealer-baltimore-police-officer-west-
baltimore; Theo Emery, Baltimore Police Scandal Spotlights Leader’s Fight to Root 
Out Corruption, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2012), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/09/us/baltimore-police-corruption-case-tests-
commissioner.html?_r=0; Jeff Hager,  Baltimore’s Top Cop Turns to Outsiders to 
Clean up Corruption Inside Police Department, ABC NEWS (Jan. 27, 2012), 
available at http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/news/baltimores-top-cop-turns-to-
outsiders-to-clean-up-corruption-inside-police-department; Patrick R. Lynch,  Police 
Misconduct: Signs of a Breakdown of Civil Society, BALT. SUN (Aug. 19, 2011), 
available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2011-08-19/news/bs-ed-police-
shooting-letter-20110819_1_police-misconduct-police-officer-civil-society; Justin 
Fenton, Lead Detective in Barnes Case Charged in 2012 Incident,  BALT. SUN (Apr. 
29, 2013),  http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-04-29/news/bal-lead-detective-in-
phylicia-barnes-case-criminally-charged-in-2012-incident-20130429_1_phylicia-
barnes-detective-daniel-t-detective-nicholson; Justin Fenton,  Baltimore Officer 
Pleads Guilty to Armed Drug Conspiracy, BALT. SUN (Mar. 11, 2013), available at 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-03-11/news/bs-md-ci-police-officer-plea-
richburg-20130311_1_kendell-richburg-informant-baltimore-officer; Justin Fenton, 
Baltimore Police Officer Charged with Lying in Search Warrant, BALT. SUN (Nov. 
2, 2012), available at http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-11-02/news/bs-md-ci-
city-officer-perjury-20121101_1_search-warrant-misconduct-charges-baltimore-
police-officer. 
40 MD. RULE § 4-211 (outlining the methods of charging). 
41 Id.; Who Does What in District Court, MDCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/selfhelp/whodoeswhat.html (last visited Sept. 
26, 2014) (many people are surprised to learn that, in Maryland, a private citizen, 
without any police involvement, can appear before a district court commissioner, any 
time of day or night, to apply for criminal charges to be issued against another 
individual; the commissioner decides whether a warrant or summons will issue: “If 
warrant is issued, the document will be given to a law enforcement agency, which is 
responsible for finding and arresting the accused person.”).  This system arguably 
sets up a mechanism for private persons to use the criminal justice system as a 
weapon in interpersonal relationships. See State v. Smith, 305 Md. 489, 505 A.2d 
511(1986) (holding that a district court commissioner, acting on an affidavit of a 
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district court commissioner will “review the application to determine 
whether a crime has been committed and if there is reason to believe that 
the . . . accused committed the crime.  If the commissioner determines that 
there is probable cause, a charging document is issued.”42 
     When a commissioner approves the misdemeanor charges issued against 
an individual, the trial date will be set approximately thirty days after the 
arrest.  At that time the individual would receive the State’s offer and have 
the opportunity to have a trial before a district court judge, pray a jury trial,43 
or accept a guilty plea.44  
     When charged with certain felonies,45 Maryland law prohibits and 
individual from being tried in district court, the court in which bail was set.46  
Under these circumstances, the district court has no jurisdiction.   After a 
preliminary hearing or an indictment by a grand jury, the felony case would 
be heard in circuit court, where the defendant is afforded the right to a jury 
trial.47    
     The Maryland Rules require that a preliminary hearing, where live 
witnesses are required to testify before a judge in support of the State’s case, 
must take place within thirty days of a defendant’s timely request.48  At that 
time, a judge must decide if probable cause exists to support the felony 
charge.   If the district court judge finds probable cause, the State must file a 
charging document in circuit court within thirty days.49   
     The State’s Attorney for Baltimore City seems to have adopted a policy of 
indicting felony cases in lieu of presenting live witnesses at preliminary 
hearings.50  There is no time requirement for the filing of an indictment 
private citizen, was authorized to issue a warrant, and that such an issuance did not 
violate the defendant’s due process rights). 
42 Who Does What in District Court, supra note 41.  
43 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(e)(2)(i)-(ii) (stating someone who is 
charged with a misdemeanor which carries more than ninety days of incarceration as 
a maximum penalty has the option of praying a jury trial, in which case the case 
would be forwarded to the circuit court). 
44 Md. R. 4-211(b)(1).  
45 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 4-302(a). 
46 Id. § 4-302(e)(2)(i).  
47 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § § 4-102, 103. 
48 Md. R. 4-211(b)(1); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-103. 
49 Md. R. 4-221(f)(1).  
50 This has been the experience of the Authors of this Article.  See also MD. CODE 
ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 4-103(c)(2) (“If the defendant is charged by grand 
jury indictment, the right of a defendant to a preliminary hearing is not absolute but 
the court may allow the defendant to have a preliminary hearing.”).  See also United 
States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1195 (9th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a 
grand jury acts as a “rubber stamp” and “affirms what the prosecutor calls upon it to 
affirm—investigating as it is led, ignoring what it is never advised to notice, failing 
to indict or indicting as the prosecutor ‘submits’ that it should” (quoting Marvin E. 
Frankel & Gary Naftalis, The Grand Jury: An Institution on Trial, 9, (Farrar Straus 
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under Maryland statutory law.  In fact, the Maryland Rules and the Criminal 
Procedure Article are both relatively silent on the subject of indictment—no 
guideposts exist for how the grand jury is convened, what the standard of 
proof is, or any filing deadlines.51   
     If your case is in felony status, then by the time you have wend your way 
through the process to arrive in circuit court, more than ninety days will have 
typically passed.52  The video bail review hearing in district court will 
determine the amount of money necessary to gain your freedom.  An 
individual unable to post the designated amount of bail, as set by the district 
court during the video bail proceeding, may lose his liberty before the 
government has even “committed itself to prosecute” by filing an indictment 
(the charging document on which a defendant is “subject to be tried . . . ”).53 
 
B. The Importance of a Bail Review Hearing for Felony Cases in a 
General Jurisdiction Court:54 Speedy Trial Concerns 
 
     The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a speedy trial.  
One of the primary purposes of this right is “to prevent undue and oppressive 
Giroux) (1977))); People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 124-25 (1990) ( Titone, J., 
dissenting) (Arguing that the prosecutor who presented the case to a grand jury was 
unlicensed but the majority held that this did not undermine the underlying 
prosecutorial jurisdiction; Titone, J., dissenting, notes that “a Grand Jury can indict 
anyone or anything—even a ham sandwich.  Now, under the majority's holding, 
apparently anyone can present the People's case to the Grand Jury—even an 
unadmitted layperson masquerading as an attorney.”). 
51 Clark v. State, 364 Md. 611, 643, 774 A.2d 1136, 1155 (2001) (“Maryland has no 
statute prescribing a time limit for seeking an indictment for felonies and 
penitentiary misdemeanors.”).  But see ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 
SPEEDY TRIAL AND TIMELY RESOLUTION OF CRIMINAL CASES 8 (3d ed. 2006) (“An 
indictment, information, or other formal charging instrument should be filed within 
thirty days after the defendant's first appearance in court after either an arrest or 
issuance of a citation or summons . . . .”). 
52 See Walsh, supra note 9, at 40. 
53 State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 574-75, 471 A.2d 712, 716 (1984).  But see Vernon’s 
Ann.Texas C.C.P. Art. 12.01, 17.151 (2013) (requiring that a “defendant who is 
detained in jail pending trial of an accusation against him must be released either on 
personal bond or by reducing the amount of bail required, if the state is not ready for 
trial of the criminal action for which he is being detained within . . . [ninety] days 
from the commencement of his detention if he is accused of a felony . . . ”; Texas 
also outlines time limits within which a case must be indicted, even when the 
accused is released on his own recognizance). 
54 Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. §1-501 (explaining that the Circuit Court is also 
referred to as a court of original jurisdiction and that “[t]he circuit courts are the 
highest common-law and equity courts of record exercising original jurisdiction 
within the State.”); Walsh, supra note 9, at 39 (describing the unlimited jurisdiction). 
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incarceration prior to trial . . . .”55  The four-factor test of Barker v. Wingo56 
is used to determine whether a case should be dismissed for the lack of a 
speedy trial.57  The “speedy trial clock” starts upon “a formal indictment or 
information or else the actual restraints imposed by arrest and holding to 
answer a criminal charge . . . .”58  As discussed, the district court does not 
have jurisdiction over felony cases.59   The defendant cannot be tried on a 
statement of probable cause, which is “an accusation made by a peace officer 
or other person.”60  Therefore, the speedy trial clock for a felony does not 
start upon filing of a statement of probable cause alone, but upon the arrest 
alleged in the charging document.61    
     Multiple postponements in felony cases are common in the Circuit Court 
of Maryland for Baltimore City.62  Frequently, cases are postponed due to a 
lack of court availability, despite neither party requesting additional time.63  
In analyzing a constitutional speedy trial claim, overcrowded courts are 
considered a more neutral reason, but “nevertheless should be considered 
since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the 
government rather than with the defendant.”64  Many times, the State or the 
defense requests a postponement to complete more investigation, which 
sometimes is a result of high caseloads faced by both sides.65    
     In addition to the constitutional right to a speedy trial, Maryland Rule 4-
271 requires that a trial be granted within one hundred eighty days of 
55 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (citing United States v. Ewell, 
383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)). 
56 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-33 (1972).  
57 United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984) (quoting United States v. 
MacDonald, 456 U.S. 1, 8 (1982)).  See Part VI, infra, for a discussion of other due 
process violations in the context of video bail review hearings (arguing that the 
defendant has a due process right to a speedy trial, which is implicated when the 
defendant appears on video for his bail review hearing, since (1) video bail hearings 
increase the risk of pretrial incarceration and (2) as the Supreme Court has stated, the 
“speedy trial right exists primarily to protect an individual's liberty interest, ‘to 
minimize the possibility of lengthy incarceration prior to trial . . . ’”).  
58 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). 
59 See supra Part II.A. 
60 State v. Gee, 298 Md. 565, 572, 471 A.2d 712, 715 (1984). 
61 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 8. 
62 See Walsh, supra note 9, at 39. 
63 See id. 
64 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).  
65 Wilson v. State, 44 Md.App. 1, 10-11, 408 A.2d. 102, 108 (1979) (“[D]elay 
caused by the reasonable preparation and orderly process of the case for some 
undetermined period will not be weighed against the State.”).  But see Barker, 407 
U.S. at 531 (“[O]vercrowded courts should be weighed less heavily but nevertheless 
should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must 
rest with the government rather than with the defendant.”). 
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arraignment66 or the date that counsel for defendant filed their written 
appearance.67  For a case to be postponed past the one hundred eighty day 
deadline, or the “Hicks date,” an administrative judge must find good cause 
for the delay.68  In enacting Maryland Rule 4-271, the Maryland “Legislature 
intended [to] prevent chronic delay,” but when the delay is due to “an 
isolated instance rather than a recurring problem” a finding of good cause is 
within the administrative judge’s discretion.69  Few practitioners would 
disagree that the court is chronically congested, and defense lawyers must 
warn their clients about the possibility of no court being available resulting 
in a postponement.70  Regardless of the chronic congestion against which 
Maryland Rule 4-271 was designed to protect, judges in Baltimore City will 
routinely find good cause for a postponement when there is no court 
available.71    
     The Circuit Court of Maryland for Baltimore City sporadically operates 
under a “Differentiated Case Management System” (“DCM”) that outlines 
the prescribed length of delay from arraignment to trial date for different 
categories of cases.72  The focus of the DCM system is the anticipated length 
of the trial.  Under the DCM, if the trial is expected to take less than three 
66 Md. R. § 4-271. 
67 Id. 
68 State v. Hicks, 285 Md. 310, 318, 403 A.2d 356, 360 (1979) (holding that 
dismissal of criminal charges is the appropriate sanction where the State fails to 
bring the case to trial within the one hundred twenty day period prescribed by the 
rule and where “extraordinary cause” justifying a trial postponement has not been 
established). 
69 State v. Toney, 315 Md. 122, 134, 553 A.2d 696, 702 (1989) (quoting State v. 
Frazier, 298 Md. 422, 463, 470 A.2d 1269, 1290 (1984)(emphasis added)).  See also 
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 50 (“Delay resulting 
from chronic congestion of the docket or from failure of the prosecutor to be 
prepared to go to trial within the allowable period should not be excused.”). 
70 Dennis Laye, an experienced defense attorney practicing in Baltimore City, 
remarked, “I advise my incarcerated clients that they will wait at least a year, quite 
possibly two, before they get a jury trial.”  Personal Interview, August 9, 2013.  But 
see Frazier, 298 Md. at 458, 470 A.2d at 1288 (explaining that Baltimore City at the 
time of the trial was not “chronically congested” as the “average disposition time for 
a criminal case [was] 139 days after filing” and, “the proportion of criminal cases 
which must be postponed by the administrative judge beyond the 180-day deadline, 
and in which the defendant did not seek or expressly consent to such postponement, 
[was] less than two percent.”).  At the time of publication, officials from the Circuit 
Court for Baltimore City and Judicial Information Systems in Annapolis, Maryland 
both indicated that the complete data of the sort cited in Frazier was not available.  
The circuit court did provide the statistic that the average time from filing to 
disposition was 228 days.   
71 State v. Bonev, 299 Md. 79, 81, 472 A.2d 476 (1984). 
72 CIRCUIT COURT OF MARYLAND FOR BALTIMORE CITY, 
http://www.baltocts.state.md.us/criminal/crim-pract.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2014). 
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days, the first trial date should be set within sixty days after the arraignment, 
while cases that involve “serious personal injury or death” should have a trial 
date set within one hundred twenty days after the arraignment.73  Despite 
standards implemented by both the American Bar Association and the 
National Association of Pretrial Service Agencies distinguishing detained 
defendants from those on bail for purposes of scheduling, Baltimore City’s 
DCM system does not consider a defendant’s incarceration as a factor.74   
     Regardless of the reasons for the delay, a defendant who cannot post bail 
is likely to wait a year or more before being given a trial.  Maryland has a 
two-tier system, “with a limited jurisdiction court responsible for initial 
proceedings in felony cases and a general jurisdiction court receiving the 
case only after an indictment or other formal charging instrument has been 
filed . . . .”75  In this system, “issues related to the defendant’s custody status 
are typically addressed first in a limited jurisdiction court (at the defendant’s 
first appearance following arrest) and again at the formal arraignment on a 
felony indictment or information in the original jurisdiction court.”76   
     These “re-reviews” of custody status only occur in the Circuit Court of 
Maryland for Baltimore City upon a written motion by the defendant.77  In 
73 Id. 
74ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 2(“In establishing 
statutes or rules for speedy trial and goals and practices for timely resolution of 
criminal cases, jurisdictions should . . . distinguish between defendants in detention 
and defendants on pretrial release.  The time limits concerning speedy trial for 
detained defendants should ordinarily be shorter than the limits applicable to 
defendants on pretrial release.”).  See also THE NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. 
AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 3 (“Every jurisdiction should establish, by statute or 
court rule, accelerated time limitations within which detained defendants should be 
tried consistent with the sound administration of justice. These accelerated time 
limitations should be shorter than current speedy trial time limitations applicable to 
defendants on pretrial release. The failure to try a detained defendant within such 
accelerated time limitations should result in the defendant’s immediate release from 
detention under reasonable conditions that best minimize the risk of flight and 
danger to the community pending trial, unless the delay is attributable to or agreed to 
by the defendant.”).  
75 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 51, at 58. 
76 THE NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 3. 
77 Md. R. § 4-216.1(c) (“[s]upervision of detention pending trial. In order to 
eliminate unnecessary detention, the court shall exercise supervision over the 
detention of defendants pending trial. It shall require from the sheriff, warden, or 
other custodial officer a weekly report listing each defendant within its jurisdiction 
who has been held in custody in excess of seven days pending preliminary hearing, 
trial, sentencing, or appeal. The report shall give the reason for the detention of each 
defendant.”). 
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practice the onus is placed on the defendant to rebut an unspoken 
presumption of lengthy pretrial incarceration.78   
     The strain on the right to a speedy trial makes the need for a meaningful 
initial appearance even more pronounced.  For reasons discussed below, 
CCTV bail review hearings lack the necessary safeguards and, therefore, 
result in erroneous deprivation of liberty. 
 
III. DEHUMANIZING EFFECTS OF CCTV ON THE ACCUSED 
 
A. How CCTV Communication Affects Perception 
 
     Videoconferencing has been proven to negatively affect perceptions of 
those depicted in several arenas both inside and outside of the criminal 
justice system.  This section will discuss concepts in social science that 
explain how personal interactions, from brief encounters to relationships that 
develop over the course of a lifetime, are based on the ability to experience 
another’s identity and allow people to form judgments of one another.  
Creating a social interaction in which one can perceive another’s identity is 
what “engenders feelings of engagement or connectedness.”79  Social 
interactions are most authentic when individuals can experience one 
another’s identity in a way that reminds them of their own humanity or when 
they are able to form an attachment to another.80  
     Videoconferencing, as a vehicle for communication, cannot replicate 
face-to-face communication in real time, despite constant innovation.81  A 
technology-based mode of communication creates distance between the 
interactants, which deprives them of “the richness of social and sensory 
information that is available face to face.”82   
78 Md. R. § 4-252 (“[M]atters shall be raised by motion in conformity with this Rule 
and if not so raised are waived unless the court, for good cause shown, orders 
otherwise.”). 
79 Bjorn Bengtsson et al., The Impact of Anthropomorphic Interfaces on Influence, 
Understanding, and Credibility, 32 ANN. HAW. INT'L. CONF. SYSTEMS SCI. 1, 3 
(1999) (“Normal interaction is comprised of the identities of individuals involved in 
interaction.  Identity creates an impression of the social, which in turn engenders 
feelings of engagement or connectedness.”). 
80  Id. at 5 (“Social interaction with technology seems to arise from the general 
psychological tendency of people to response socially in situations in which they are 
reminded of their own humanity or social selves, or in which they form an 
attachment to another.”). 
81  See Frank M. Walsh & Edward M. Walsh, Effective Processing or Assembly Line 
Justice? The Use of Teleconference in Asylum Removal Hearings, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 259, 267–69 (2008).  
82  Bengtsson et al., supra note 79, at 3 (Researchers found that “despite 
technological advances that are constantly expanding the frontiers of what is 
feasible, at present computes still interact awkwardly.  They are unable to supply the 
kind of contingent and fully synchronous interaction that is present in face-to-face 
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     This concept applies to the interaction that occurs when a defendant 
comes before a judge.  The judge’s social interaction with the defendant will 
influence the defendant’s perceived credibility, truthfulness, and 
dangerousness.83  If the interaction between the judge and defendant fails to 
develop or is critically impaired, they will be unable to adequately 
experience each other’s humanity.  In-person interactions are crucial to 
making these determinations because the synchronistic nature of interaction 
allows individuals to continuously tailor their speech and conduct to increase 
their appearance of credibility.84  Therefore, it is essential that “the judge [] 
come face-to-face with the primary informational sources, and probe for 
what is obscure, trap what is elusive, and settle what is controversial.”85  
     A psychological study found that participants who communicated through 
a computer program, as opposed to in-person, perceived the computer-based 
communication to be significantly less credible.86  This study also found that 
in-person interactions were seen as “more sociable, likeable, dynamic, and 
truthful.”87  In another study, researchers found that mock jurors, who rated 
the testimony of child witnesses testifying in court against testimony via 
closed-circuit video, found the in-court testimony to be more believable, 
despite the fact that the closed-circuit video testimony was actually more 
accurate.88  Child witnesses who testify in court have also been found to be 
more accurate, intelligent, attractive, and honest than closed-circuit video 
testimony.89  The same study found that jurors were more likely to render a 
conversation.  Moreover, the sheer interjection of an electronic medium may 
‘distance’ interactants relative to face-to-face interaction. And computer agents, even 
in multimedia form, do not supply the richness of social and sensory information that 
is available face-to-face.”). 
83  See id. at 266 (“All aspects of the witness's demeanor-including the expression of 
his countenance, how he sits or stands, whether he is inordinately nervous, his 
coloration during critical examination, the modulation or pace of his speech and 
other nonverbal communication-may convince the observing trial judge that the 
witness is testifying truthfully or falsely.”). 
84  Bengtsson et al., supra note 79, at 4 (“It is plausible that humans have more 
behavioral resources at their disposal to achieve an appealing and credible demeanor 
and that they are better able to adapt their conversation if there are indications that 
their image is suffering.”). 
85  United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  
86 Id. at 12. 
87 Id. at 11 (“Consistent with the argument that social identification is a key 
consideration in assessing communication formats, partners were seen as more 
sociable, likeable, dynamic, and truthful when participants engaged in face to face 
than human-computer interaction.”). 
88 Molly Treadway Johnson & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Videoconferencing in Criminal 
Proceedings: Legal and Empirical Issues and Directions for Research, 28 LAW & 
POL’Y 211, 221 (2006). 
89 Id. 
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guilty verdict when the child witness testified in court.90  Across disciplines, 
studies have found that real time interactions are more impactful than the 
video facsimile and the fact-finder’s ability to assess characteristics of the 
defendant via video are critically impaired.91  
     Social interaction is comprised of infinite verbal and nonverbal cues.  
Videoconference bail reviews limit the amount of available information that 
would be useful to the judge in making a pretrial release determination.92  
Face-to-face communication allows participants to incorporate nonverbal 
expression into the interpersonal exchange.93  A defendant’s eye contact, 
posture, and gestures may not be accurately transmitted to the judge, yet 
these signals provide valuable insight into the defendant’s character.94  
Research suggests that viewing gestures and other nonverbal communication 
can aid the viewer’s comprehension and increase the likeability of the 
speaker.95   
     Specifically, research has found that eye contact influences the speaker’s 
perceived credibility and trustworthiness.96  Eye contact is one of the most 
important nonverbal gestures that can foster feelings of connectedness.97  
Witnesses who maintain continuous eye contact with their communication 
target were considered more credible than the witnesses who held a 
downward gaze.98  Some individuals even associate a downward gaze with 
deception or distrust.99  The logistics of a videoconference interaction makes 
eye contact impossible, further aggravating the judge’s ability to form an 
adequate assessment of the defendant on the other end of the camera.100  
     Voice cues, as well as nonverbal expression, are also altered by the use of 
videoconference technology.101  Video technology can diminish or amplify 
the defendant’s affect, thus impacting the judge’s perception of the 
90 Id. at 221-22. 
91 See Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of 
Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
869, 879 (2010). 
92 Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 268. 
93 Bengtsson et al., supra note 79, at 6 (“Additionally, humans have greater ability to 
be nonverbally expressive and energetic, which may gain them benefits in terms of 
dynamism.”). 
94 Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 215. 
95 Id. at 222.  
96 Id. at 268–69. 
97 Id.  
98 Id. at 222 (“These findings are relevant in that a defendant participating in a 
videoconferenced proceeding might naturally direct his attention to the terminal 
present at his location, rather than directly into the camera, thus making him appear 
to be averting his gaze.”).  
99 Id.  
100 Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 222; see also Walsh & Walsh, 
supra note 81, at 268–69.  
101 Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 216. 
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defendant.102  Emotion is often conveyed in the lowest and highest vocal 
frequencies, which is partially lost in video transmission.103  This hinders the 
defendant’s ability to show remorse or demonstrate credibility.104  A psycho-
social study concluded: “Overall, it would appear that face-to-face 
interaction is best for generating positive social judgments and interpersonal 
relationships.”105  
     The most troubling aspect of videoconference bail hearings is the physical 
distance between the judge and the defendant that causes the defendant to be 
dehumanized.106  Impaired perception, diminished credibility, and inability to 
view nonverbal cues diminish the social interaction between the judge and 
defendant.  Psychologists have found that “perceive[ing] another in terms of 
common humanity activates empathetic emotional reactions through 
perceived similarity and a sense of social obligation.”107  If “[m]oral actions 
are the products of the reciprocal interplay of personal and social 
influences[,]” then a judge, his perception of the defendant as a full, social 
person now impeded, is less likely to take the "moral action.”108  With 
CCTV, a judge will be less likely to consider an accused’s life circumstances 
or the impact that incarceration will have on him, reducing his chance of 
pretrial release.109  
 
B. Filling in the Gaps of Larose:110 Empirical Evidence from the Cook 
County and Asylum Hearings 
 
     Others have argued that video bail reviews deny defendants due 
process.111  Larose, a 1997 case, is the only opinion in the United States that 
deals with the constitutionality of video bail reviews.112  The Larose court 
held that “bail hearings concern a legally protected interest,” but reasoned 
that the petitioners failed to show that the video bail procedure resulted in a 
102 Id.; See also Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 268. 
103 Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 216. 
104 Id. 
105 Bengtsson et al., supra note 79, at 13–14.      
106 See Seidman Diamond, supra note 91, at 879. See also Walsh & Walsh, supra 
note 81, at 269. 
107  Albert Bandura, Moral Disengagement in the Perpetration of Inhumanities, 3 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 193, 200 (1999). 
108 Id. at 207. 
109 Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 269. 
110 Larose v. Superintendent, Hillsborough Cnty. Corr. Admin., 702 A.2d 326 (N.H. 
1997).   
111 Treadway Johnson & Wiggins, supra note 88, at 215 (“Some commentators have 
argued that, because of the effects of videoconferencing on the behavior and 
perceptions of participants in a criminal proceeding, its use amounts to a denial of 
due process for the defendant.”). 
112 Larose, 702 A.2d 326. 
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“greater risk of erroneous deprivation of that liberty” as enumerated in the 
Matthews v. Eldridge test.113  No data was presented to demonstrate that 
technology based hearings adversely affected the defendant’s liberty 
interest.114   
     The Larose court considered the testimony of the petitioners’ expert 
witness, a psychologist, who opined that “teleconferencing procedure would 
adversely bias a judge’s opinion of a defendant” even though  “he testified 
that he had never seen a tape of a video bail hearing, [] none of the articles to 
which he referred related directly to the issue, and that he had never spoken 
with either a judge or a defendant who had participated in such a hearing.”115  
The court considered a defense attorney’s testimony that “conducting a bail 
hearing by video affected his ability to be an effective advocate for a client 
‘to some extent[,]’” but that “he had no knowledge of how the video bail 
hearings were currently being conducted . . . .”116   
     A subsequent study demonstrates that videoconference bail review 
hearings result in significantly higher bails than live hearings.117  In 1999, the 
Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois issued a general order requiring that 
bail reviews, with limited cases excepted, “be conducted by means of closed 
circuit television.”118  In 2006, Locke Bowman of the MacArthur Justice 
Center filed a class action lawsuit, and a study was later conducted to 
analyze how video bail hearings affected outcomes.119  Locke Bowman and 
Shari Diamond gathered information from the Cook County Clerk’s Office 
regarding cases eight and one half years prior to the video bails and eight and 
one half years after.120  A study of 645,117 cases revealed “average bond 
amount for the offenses that shifted to televised hearings increased by an 
average of 51% across all of the CCTV cases.”121  The same study noted that 
“increases of between 54% and 90% occurred for six major felonies 
subjected to the CCTV.”122  Through statistical analysis, the researchers 
concluded that the “change cannot be attributed to general trends or seasonal 
variations.”123  Cook County voluntarily halted its use of CCTV bond 
hearings on December 15, 2008.124  One observer noted: 
113 Id. at 329.  See infra notes 225–26 and accompanying text. 
114 Larose, 702 A.2d at 329 
115 Id.  
116 Id. at 328–29. 
117 See Diamond, supra note 91, at 870. 
118 Id. at 883.   
119 Id. at 886. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 897. 
 
122 Id. 
123 Diamond, supra note 91, at 897 (“Indeed, results show that immediately after the 
[closed circuit television procedure] went into effect, the average bond amount for 
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The substantial increases in bail levels that immediately 
followed the implementation of videoconferenced bail 
hearings in Cook County, and which occurred only for the 
offenses that shifted to videoconferenced hearings, provide 
precisely the evidence that was missing in Larose125 and 
should raise questions about the harmful effects of 
videoconferenced hearings on defendants.126  
 
     In the context of immigration court, CCTV hearings have yielded similar 
results.  A statistical analysis of the outcome of over 500,000 asylum 
removal hearings showed that in-person litigants fare substantially better 
than those who appear on camera.127  Data from the Executive Office for 
Immigration Review indicated that the “grant rate for asylum applicants 
whose cases were heard in-person is roughly double the grant rate for the 
applicants whose cases were heard via [CCTV].”128  It should be noted that 
even when controlling for the variable of counsel, there was still a 
statistically significant difference in outcome between live and televised 
asylum hearings.129  Represented applicants who appeared in person showed 
a 38% chance of having their application granted, while those represented 
applicants who appeared via video had only a 23% chance of gaining 
asylum.130  
 
IV. DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS AGAINST CCTV FOR BAIL REVIEWS OF 
FELONY CASES 
 
Those whom we would banish from society or from the 
human community itself often speak in too faint a voice to 
be heard above society’s demand for punishment.  It is the 
particular role of courts to hear these voices, for the 
the non-treated felonies rose an insignificant 13% (see Figure 8 and Table 1), while 
the average for treated felonies rose a significant 51%.”). 
124 Id. 
125 Larose v. Superintendent, Hillsborough Cnty. Corr. Admin., 702 A.2d 326, 329 
(N.H. 1997) (holding that videoconference bail review hearings did not violate due 
process, as “[n]o evidence was offered to suggest that judges set bail at a higher 
amount for defendants who were arraigned by the video procedures than by in-
person procedures.”). 
126 Diamond, supra note 91, at 898. 
127 Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 259. 
128 Id. at 271. 
129 Id. at 271–72. 
130 Id. at 272.   
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Constitution declares that the majoritarian chorus may not 
alone dictate the conditions of social life.131 
 
     Bail review hearings are intended to secure the accused’s appearance at 
trial.  Modern day conveniences are transforming the culture of bail review 
hearings, minimizing the role the defendant plays in one of the most crucial 
stages preceding his trial.  At a videoconference bail review hearing, many 
defendants lose their freedom without being afforded procedural safeguards 
guaranteed by the Due Process Clause.132  Without these necessary 
protections, the risk that defendants are deprived of liberty without due 
process of law increases.  Pretrial incarceration impacts the financial, 
emotional, and physical well-being of detainees and undermines their 
confidence in the criminal justice system.133 
     This section will discuss the constitutional violations of CCTV bail 
review hearings, including the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, 
defendants’ right to be physically present at the hearing, and their right to 
confront the witnesses against them.  Videoconference hearings erode the 
safeguards inherent in live hearings, thereby denying the accused their right 
to due process of law when their liberty is on the line.     
     Not every defendant’s experience is identical.  Therefore, it is important 
to note that, while all of the violations identified are relevant, they exist 
collectively in varying degrees based on the particular circumstances 
surrounding the administration of the hearing.  Due Process is a prism 
through which these constitutional and common law rights will be viewed.  
The rights discussed exist to protect liberty.  When they are violated, the risk 
of erroneous deprivation of liberty increases. 
 
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Ethical Considerations 
 
     Representing indigent defendants in their first appearance in Baltimore 
City is a task that takes on a frenzied pace.  Public Defender Management 
arrives at Central Booking at around 7:15 a.m. to prepare the docket for the 
attorneys, who arrive shortly thereafter.  Each docket consists of ten or more 
felony and misdemeanor cases.  The attorneys study the charging documents, 
manually research their clients’ criminal history; and attempt to call family 
and employers to verify defenses, ties to the community, and to inquire if 
bail will be posted on the defendants’ behalf.  By 11:00 a.m., the attorney is 
ready to meet with her clients and begin the interviews.  A meaningful 
131 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 343 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).  
132 Walsh & Walsh, supra note 81, at 273. 
133 See generally Walsh, supra note 9, at 27 (“Even a short stint in jail can disrupt a 
person’s employment, education, and housing and exacerbate existing health 
conditions (or create new ones) . . . .”).  See also Mika’il DeVeaux, The Trauma of 
the Incarceration Experience, 48 HARV. C. R.- C. L. L. REV. 259 (2013). 
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interview lasts about fifteen minutes, yet if the attorney expects to reach the 
courthouse from the jail before the docket begins, fifteen minutes per client 
is too much time spent.134 
     The time constraints CCTV imposes on an attorney undoubtedly have a 
critical impact on the effectiveness of his representation.135  Every day public 
defenders in Baltimore City face a reoccurring dilemma: Whether to sacrifice 
time with their client136 or their physical presence before the judge.137  
Neither situation is adequate.  Once the initial client interview is over, the 
accused is banished from his attorney’s side and denied access to counsel. 
 
          i. CCTV Denies the Accused Assistance of Counsel 
 
     The Sixth Amendment guarantees that a defendant has a right to the 
effective assistance of counsel,138, and “unrestricted access”139 thereof.  In 
Gideon v.  Wainwright, the Supreme Court guaranteed indigent defendants 
the right to appointed counsel; this right is extended to the states by the Due 
134 CCTV bail review dockets occur in two courthouses: John R. Hargrove, Sr. 
Building (Southern), which is approximately 5 miles from Central Booking, and 
Borgerding District Court Building (Wabash), which is approximately 9 miles from 
Central Booking. The Southern docket is comprised of women, and begins at 1:00 
p.m. . The Wabash docket begins at 2:00 p.m.  
135 In a private interview with Judge Braverman, he discussed a common perception: 
that private attorneys can often be more effective than public defenders in the bail 
review setting because they are only committed to a single client. A private attorney 
has more resources and time to verify the client’s facts and is more likely to present 
compelling information that may appeal to the judge during the hearing.  Interview 
with the Honorable Judge Nathan Braverman, District Court of Maryland for 
Baltimore City (June 18, 2013). 
136 Zachary M. Hillman, Is a Defendant Constitutionally “Present” when Pleading 
Guilty by Video Teleconference?, 7 J. HIGH TECH. L. 41, 63 (2007). (“One public 
defender summed up the situation succinctly: ‘An attorney can’t be two places at 
once; we don’t want to leave the client alone.’”). 
137 Public Defenders are not mandated to be present at the accused’s case before a 
judge. The decision to remain in Central Booking is purely one for the attorney to 
decide. See Thaxton, supra note 20, at 192 (footnotes omitted) (“[P]lacing the 
defense counsel in the jail with the defendant denies counsel the opportunity for a 
full exchange with the judge and the prosecuting attorney.”).  
138 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). The Supreme Court has not 
explicitly extended Sixth Amendment right to counsel to an initial bail review 
hearing. Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty, 554 U.S. 191, 199 (2008) (requiring states to 
not unreasonably delay the assigning of counsel, not necessarily establishing a U.S. 
Constitutional right to counsel at bail reviews). 
139 Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284 (1989) (“It is the defendant's right to 
unrestricted access to his lawyer for advice on a variety of trial-related matters that is 
controlling in the context of a long recess.”).  See generally Geders v. United States, 
425 U.S. 80 (1976).  
                                                                                                                             
2014] Charm City Televised & Dehumanized  
 
79 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.140  Effectiveness of counsel is 
interdependent on the defendant’s presence, and as such, the defendant’s 
right to counsel, explicitly provided for by Maryland Rule 4-216(e) et seq., 
will not be fulfilled during a video bail conference.141 
     The right to counsel first attaches upon the “initiation of adversarial 
judicial criminal proceedings . . . ,” and then, only during a critical stage.142  
In 2012, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held in DeWolfe v. Richmond 
(“DeWolfe I”) that the Public Defender Act mandates that the Maryland 
Office of the Public Defender provide representation to indigent defendants 
at bail review hearings, in addition to initial appearances.143  Immediately 
after DeWolfe I144 was decided, the Maryland General Assembly amended 
140 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
141 The Supreme Court, in Halbert v. Michigan, highlighted data to support its 
conclusion that if indigent defendants, convicted after guilty pleas, did not have 
counsel to guide them through the State’s complex appellate process, their right to 
appeal would be meaningless: 
 
[Sixty-eight percent] of the state prison populatio[n] did not 
complete high school, and many lack the most basic literacy 
skills. . . .  [S]even out of ten inmates fall in the lowest two out of 
five levels of literacy-marked by an inability to do such basic tasks 
as write a brief letter to explain an error on a credit card bill, use a 
bus schedule, or state in writing an argument made in a lengthy 
newspaper article.  
 
545 U.S. 605, 621 (2005) (holding that the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses required the state to provide counsel for defendants who wanted to appeal to 
the state appellate court) (citing A. BECK & L. MARUSCHAK, Mental Health 
Treatment in State Prisons, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
pp. 3–4 (Jul. 2001), available at 
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhtsp00.pdf.); see also MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 16-209(a) ( “Communications between an indigent individual and an 
individual in the Office or engaged by the Public Defender are protected by the 
attorney-client privilege to the same extent as though an attorney had been privately 
engaged.”)). 
142 Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (holding the Sixth Amendment right 
to counsel did not attach in an identification that took place before the initiation of 
adversary judicial proceedings).  
143 DeWolfe v. Richmond, 434 Md. 403, 430-31, 76 A.3d 962, 978 (2012) 
(hereinafter “DeWolfe I”); Public Defender Act, MD CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-
204(b)(2)(i) (stating that representation shall be provided to an indigent individual in 
all stages of a proceeding, including a bail hearing before a district court or circuit 
court judge). This paper will not analyze whether, in fact, bail review is a critical 
stage, but it is assumed that the Maryland State Legislature found it critical enough 
to deem representation by counsel necessary during this stage. 
144 See generally DeWolfe I, 434 Md. 403, 76 A.3d 962; Public Defender Act, MD 
CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2)(i).  
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the Public Defender Act to exclude the guarantee of counsel from the 
defendant’s initial appearance before a commissioner.145  The legislature, 
however, left intact the guarantee to assistance of counsel during the bail 
review stage.146   
     While the Supreme Court has not held bail review hearings to be a critical 
stage, in a recent 2013 case superseding DeWolfe I,147 the same court found 
that Maryland criminal defendants have a due process right under the due 
process component of the Maryland Declaration of Rights to counsel at their 
initial bail hearings.148  The decision holds significant implications for 
ensuring indigent defendants retain all constitutional safeguards guaranteed 
during all stages of the trial.149  Early intervention by an attorney, such as 
during the bail review stage, has a substantial impact on the outcome of the 
pretrial hearing, as well as the outcome of the trial.150  
     In most cases “if the defendant has a constitutional right to be present . . . 
undoubtedly he has a constitutional right to . . . counsel at such time.”151  The 
case in Baltimore City poses a unique situation.  The Maryland Legislature 
has implicitly reaffirmed its belief that bail review hearings are a critical 
stage.  Just as the right to counsel flows from the right to presence, so does 
the right to presence flow from the right to counsel.  Case law supports the 
inference that “an essential concomitant of a defendant’s right to effective 
145 Public Defender Act, MD CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2)(ii). 
146 Id. 
147 DeWolfe, 434 Md. 403, 76 A.3d 962, on reconsideration by DeWolfe v. 
Richmond, 434 Md. 444, 456, 76 A.3d 1019, 1026 (2013)(hereinafter “DeWolfe II”) 
(further holding that indigent defendants are entitled to counsel before a 
commissioner).  
148 DeWolfe II, 434 Md. at 456, 76 A.3d at 1026. 
149 Steven Lash, Hearing: Judges, Not Commissioners, Would Set Bail on Work 
Days, MD. DAILY RECORD, Jan. 6, 2014. (“Del. Joseph F. Vallario Jr., who chairs the 
influential House Judiciary Committee, said Monday that he prefers the current 
bifurcated system of a bail hearing and review.  But he added he recognizes the 
financial strain maintaining the two-tier system would have on the state’s coffers 
following the high court’s decision in DeWolfe v. Richmond . . . Vallario, however, 
said he remains deeply opposed to holding bail hearings by videoconference…. The 
justice system must make ‘sure that a defendant has the ability to face a judge when 
he is being detained,’ added the delegate, who also handles criminal defense work as 
an attorney in private practice.”).   
150 Colbert, supra note 9 at 1758–61. 
151 Leckliter v. State, 75 Md. App. 143, 153, 540 A.2d 847, 852-53 (1988) (holding 
that the process of jury separation was merely a housekeeping measure and the 
defendant was not entitled to be present during that time and accordingly, not 
entitled to counsel at that time). 
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assistance of counsel” is the presence of the defendant.152  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has recognized: 
 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel….  
[A defendant] is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence….  He 
lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his 
defense, even though he [may] have a perfect one.  He 
requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him.153 
 
     The defendant is presumed innocent, but because he is incarcerated, he 
suffers from a deficiency of that presumption.154  He will be presented to the 
court in an ill-fitting bright yellow jumpsuit.  In the courtroom, he would be 
able to have counsel next to him to humanize him.  An attorney cannot stand 
up next to the client when he is in the detention center.155  The defendant 
becomes a miniature character on a screen instead of a human being.156  
     While the defendant is in a remote location, his lawyer cannot answer 
questions, and, perhaps most importantly, she cannot hear any variances her 
client has to the information provided by the Pretrial Services Representative 
152 United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 497–98 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (defendant 
had the right to be present during voir dire, and it was error, albeit harmless, to 
exclude him from the process). 
153 Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 88–89 (1976) (citing Powell v. Alabama, 
287 U.S. 45, 68–69 (1932)).  See also Hillman, supra note 136, at 63 (“One can 
scarcely imagine a more ineffective situation regarding counsel-client private matters 
than when the defendant and counsel are in different locations.  The defendant relies 
upon his or her attorney to offer sound advice and to argue their case as effectively 
as possible.  When a defendant is separated from his or her attorney, the situation 
changes dramatically.  The reliance and trust created during the attorney client 
relationship may become suspended by the technology.  If . . . the situation serves to 
‘chill’ communications, the attorney may not be able to adequately argue on behalf 
of his or her client, thus rendering the defendant’s situation less fair and just.”).  
154 Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth 
Amendment's Right to Bail, 32 N. KY. L. REV. 1, 50 (2005) (“There is a strong 
correlation between pretrial detainment and conviction.”).  See also BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY DEFENDANTS IN LARGE URBAN COUNTIES 16, tbl. 13 
(Dec. 2000), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc00.pdf.   
155 Anne Bowen Poulin, Criminal Justice and Videoconferencing Technology: The 
Remote Defendant, 78 TUL. L. REV. 1089, 1130 (2004) (“The defense attorney 
cannot provide the kind of support that positioning in the courtroom offers, such as 
standing up with and next to the client when the client stands”).   See also Hillman, 
supra note 136 (“One public defender summed up the situation succinctly: ‘An 
attorney can’t be two places at once; we don’t want to leave the client alone.’”). 
156 See supra Part IV (for a discussion of the psychological impact of video 
communication and  the dehumanizing effects of CCTV on the accused).  
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or the Assistant State’s Attorney.157  The attorney renders assistance at bail 
review hearings by listening to her client’s input and forming proffers and 
arguments based on the information he provides.  Counsel may be familiar 
with the case and the anticipated arguments at the hearing, but the client 
frequently has firsthand information about the nuances of the information the 
judge is to consider, such as his “family ties, employment status and history, 
financial resources, . . . length of residence in the community, and length of 
residence in [the s]tate.”158  Even if the attorney is able to consult with the 
defendant in person prior to the hearing, the advocate will not know the 
Pretrial Services representative’s or the State’s recommendation until 
moments before the hearing, or, more likely, during the hearing itself. 
     District court judges in Baltimore City weigh the factors in determining a 
defendant’s likelihood of returning to trial and his risk to public safety.  One 
district court judge likened the situation to a “crystal ball,” noting that “you 
can never know if a defendant will make bail, if in fact they will return to 
trial, or be a risk to the community.”159  This judge continued, “It is about 
balancing these factors and an attorney standing next to the defendant will 
not change the information that is provided.”160  
     The issue we face is not whether counsel can “change” the information 
that is provided, but whether counsel can render effective assistance by 
eliciting helpful and relevant information from the client and contextualizing 
the facts in light of applicable law.  CCTV in bail review hearings denies 
communication between the accused and his attorney.  The affirmative act of 
administering CCTV hearings is a form of governmental interference directly 
related to the denial of counsel.  Therefore, the principle established in 
157 The Baltimore defendant would be located at the Central Booking at 300 E. 
Madison Street, which is 1.7 miles from the Eastside District Court, 5.3 miles from 
the John R. Hargrove, Sr. District Court, or 8.8 miles from the Borgerding District 
Court. In light of the proximity from the court to the holding facility, no argument 
can be made that videoconferencing eases the burden of transporting inmates over 
long distances. See Poulin, supra note 155, at 1162 (“Courts may employ 
videoconferencing even when it seems unnecessary.  In some jurisdictions where the 
detention facility is close to the court, the court nevertheless employs 
videoconferencing.”) (footnote omitted).  But see Michael D. Roth, Laissez-Faire 
Videoconferencing: Remote Witness Testimony and Adversarial Truth, 48 UCLA L. 
REV. 185, 190-191 (2000) (“A notable example of how remote appearances can save 
time and money was the arraignment in New Jersey federal court of the alleged 
Unabomber on charges of, inter alia, first-degree murder. ‘The problem was that 
Theodore J. Kaczynski was being held in Sacramento, California. Estimated costs of 
transporting the defendant were $30,000. Using [videoconferencing] the court 
conducted the arraignment at a cost of about $45.00’”) (footnotes omitted).  
158 Md. R. § 4-216. 
159 Interview with the Honorable Judge John R. Hargrove, District Court of 
Maryland for Baltimore City, June 13, 2013. 
160 Interview with the Honorable Judge John R. Hargrove, District Court of 
Maryland for Baltimore City, June 13, 2013 (emphasis added).  
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Strickland does not apply when analyzing the defendant’s denial of his Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel in the context of videoconference bail review.161  
The central issue becomes whether the State shall be permitted to interfere 
with and restrain the accused’s right to assistance of counsel.   
     In Geders v. United States, the Supreme Court distinguised governmental 
interference with the right to counsel from counsel's failure to provide 
effective assistance.162  The Court held that the “[g]overnment violates the 
right to effective assistance when it interferes in certain ways with the ability 
of counsel to make independent decisions about how to conduct the 
defense.”163  Analogous to Geders, CCTV displaces the attorney and his 
client from the traditional seating arrangement164 where the two have the 
opportunity to converse privately, prior to, during, and after the hearing.  
Counsel’s inability to represent his client effectively is due to the inherent 
flaws of a system that was created for the convenience of the government.  
The promise of Gideon is empty when the defendant is removed from his 
own bail review hearing.165  
161 The Strickland Court held that “the benchmark for judging any claim of 
ineffectiveness must be whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper 
functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having 
produced a just result.”  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 669 (1984).  
162 Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (holding that a trial judge’s order 
preventing defendant from consulting his counsel during a seventeen hour overnight 
recess between his direct and crossexamination deprived defendant of his right to 
assistance of counsel and was invalid).  
163 Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 280 (1989), (citing Geders v. United States, 425 
U.S. 80 (1976)). 
164 CCTV allows the defendant to remain in Central Booking where he will be seated 
amongst other detainees. Collectively, their image is transmitted through a video 
camera to the judge’s courtroom. The judge’s image is simultaneously transmitted to 
a TV screen where the accused can see him seated. The attorney has the choice to 
either remain in Central Booking, where the client is located, or to travel to the 
courthouse and physically represent her clients’ cases before the judge. The latter 
clearly disconnects the two parties by miles. It may seem as if the attorney will be 
able to communicate with her client if she remains in Central Booking, but her client 
remains seated amongst others awaiting bail review and she is kept several feet 
away. The traditional seating arrangement is one in which the attorney and client are 
seated next to each other, at the same table, and the two are capable of having a 
private exchange as the hearing progresses. Simply by preventing the attorney and 
his client from having any communication, CCTV does not sustain the traditional 
role attorneys are intended to carry out when representing a client.  
165 See Gideon, 372 U.S. 335.  See also Juliana B. Humphrey, The Folly of Video 
Courts, INDIGENT DEF. (NLADA, Washington D.C., Md.) Sept–Oct. 1998, V.2 No. 
4. (“The NLADA Board of Directors in March 1990 resolved that the Association 
‘strongly’ opposed the employment of [CCTV] for criminal arraignments because of 
the adverse impact on the accused’s Sixth Amendment right to the effective 
assistance of counsel.”). 
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     Data demonstrates that representation by counsel positively impacts the 
outcome of the accused’s bail review hearing, so the denial of counsel is a 
significant factor.166  With CCTV bail reviews, attorneys have to choose 
whether to remain in the jail with their client during the hearing or to travel 
to the courthouse to be in the same room as the judge.  Judge Cooper’s 
experience is that representation is hindered if the attorney is not present in 
the courtroom, but he acknowledges the time constraints attorneys face, 
stating, “I would rather have the attorney remain with the client so he does 
not sacrifice important information-gathering time.”167  
     Proponents of CCTV bail review hearings would suggest that the system 
operates fairly when the attorney remains at Central Booking with her client.  
However, there is a lack of consistent training and oversight of correctional 
officers who organize detainees for the CCTV hearings within Central 
Booking’s videoconference room.168  By contrast, bailiffs of the court are 
accustomed to the decorum of courtroom proceedings, and the presiding 
judge is able to instruct them at any time.  When the courtroom is extended 
to the secured facility through videoconference technology, the judge is not 
privy to the hostile, demeaning, and potentially unconstitutional conduct of 
the correctional officers.169 
     During one observed instance of CCTV bail review, a correctional officer 
denied a public defender’s request to speak with one of her clients in Central 
Booking before the videoconference system was activated and before the 
judge was seated at the bench.  The judge was unaware of the controversy.  
The public defender, Megan Lewis, did not relent, and called for another 
correctional officer to intervene.  Ms. Lewis and her client were eventually 
166 Colbert, supra note 9; THE ABELL FOUND., supra note 9 (Defendants represented 
by counsel were “two and one-half times more likely to be released on their own 
recognizance . . . [t]he bail review judge reduced the bail amount for one out of 
every two [represented defendants], but only one out of every seven” who were 
unrepresented). 
167 Interview with the Honorable Judge Robert Cooper, District Court of Maryland 
for Baltimore City, June 12, 2013. 
168 See, e.g., Ian Duncan et al., Inside Jail Run From Within, THE BALT. SUN (Apr. 
28, 2013), http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/bal-black-guerrilla-family-
tavon-white-prison-corruption-20130425,0,7483161.html; Roger Baysden, Fix City 
Jail by Tearing Up Officers’ ‘Bill of Rights’, THE BALT. SUN (May 21, 2013), 
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-21/news/bs-ed-city-jail-letter-
20130521_1_maryland-voters-correctional-officers-bill-appeals-board; 
Mismanagement and Failed Leadership Led to the Debacle at Baltimore’s Jail, THE 
BALT. SUN (May 9, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-05-09/news/bs-ed-
prison-scandal-20130509_1_prison-guards-prison-system-failed-leadership. 
169 See NAT’L ASS’N PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10 (“The first 
appearance before a judicial officer should take place in such physical surroundings 
as are appropriate to the administration of justice” with commentary adding that the 
first appearance should be “conducted with the dignity and decorum that a court 
should convey.”). 
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allowed to speak, but the two correctional officers hovered over their 
conversation, failing to recognize attorney-client privilege.  Correctional 
officers maintain order within Central Booking—they are not charged with 
the duty of protecting the defendants’ rights.   
     Blockades to communication are commonplace.  These disputes are not 
always resolved in such a way that allows for the attorney to consult with her 
client.  Valuable preparation time is lost, and arguing with correctional 
officers over basic client communication standards creates an unnecessary 
distraction from the administration of justice.170 
     Extending the courtroom to untrained personnel, outside of the judge’s 
reach and view, has grave implications for the accused’s constitutional right 
to access counsel.  Whether intentional or unintentional, correctional officers 
often deny attorneys the opportunity to meet privately and to communicate 
with their client prior to, or during, a video bail docket.171 
 
          ii. Attorneys Cannot Fulfill the Ethical Duties of Advising and 
Advocating through a CCTV Proceeding 
 
     A lawyer has a duty to advise,172 to communicate with,173 and to advocate 
for her client at all times during the course of the representation.174  A lawyer 
170 “The right to a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments extends to pre-trial detainees.”  Collins v. 
Schoonfield, 344 F. Supp. 257, 280 (D. Md. 1972) (citations omitted) (holding that 
inadequate facilities in attorney-client visiting rooms constituted denial of effective 
assistance of counsel when a pretrial detainee in city jail was prevented from 
communicating with his attorney as a form of discipline).  Collins can be analogized 
to the method in which bail review hearings are currently conducted.  The separation 
of the attorney from his client during the hearing hampers the attorney’s ability to 
confer with his client and to riposte statements made by Pretrial Services.  If the 
attorney is in the courthouse and the accused remains in Central Booking, CCTV 
disconnects the attorney from his client. In the case of Baltimore City, there is no 
alternative for the attorney and his client to confer during the bail review hearing, in 
private, without breaking privilege.  Attorneys are not provided with a secured phone 
or fax line in which they can privately confer or share documents with their clients 
during the hearing.  See also Jack Rubin, Central Booking and Jails are Failing, THE 
BALT. SUN, Aug. 7, 2012, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-08-07/news/bs-ed-
jail-letter-20120807_1_deplorable-conditions-baltimore-city-detention-center-
interviews. 
171 This has been the experience of the Authors. 
172 Md. R. 16-812 (2005) (also codified and set forth in Appendix as MD. LAWYERS’ 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4 (2005)) (hereinafter “MLRPC”).  See also Ideals 
of Professionalism, MARYLAND PROFESSIONAL CENTER, INC., 
http://www.marylandprofessionalism.org/images/pdf/2216633.pdf (last visited Sept. 
16, 2014) (“[Lawyers should] keep a client apprised of the status of important 
matters affecting the client and inform the client of the frequency with which 
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cannot effectively communicate with her client over a closed circuit 
television system, as the defendant will not be able to confer in 
confidence.175  All exchanges will be audible to the judge, the prosecution, 
the members of the public in the courtroom, and other inmates and jail 
personnel located in the room from where the defendant’s images are being 
projected.  Communications that would be privileged if the defendant were 
present become very public.  All the defendant’s statements will be recorded, 
and could be used against him.176  
     Specifically, the defendant, over CCTV, will not be able to benefit from 
counsel’s advice about decorum.177  The defendant may want to interject 
facts or arguments, and counsel will not, over video, be able to discretely 
information will be provided, understanding that some matters will require regular 
contact . . . .”). 
173 See the MLRPC, supra note 172, R. 2.1.   See also Preamble to MLRPC, supra 
note 172 (“[A]s advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding 
of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications.”). 
174 See Preamble to MLRPC, supra note 172 (“[A]s advocate, a lawyer zealously 
asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.”). 
175 Hillman, supra note 136, at 63 (“Furthermore, even if the defendant and counsel 
can speak over a private line, counsel will suffer from the same problems that a 
judge may encounter when video teleconference is used, i.e., the inability to detect 
non[]verbal [sic] cues and the problems caused by the camera-video setup. . . .  
[E]ven if privileged communications can be provided, the relationship and 
conversation between attorney and defendant may be chilled. This will contribute to 
a lower threshold of advice and communication which weighs unfairly against the 
defendant.”) (footnotes omitted). 
176 Fenner v. State, 381 Md. 1, 27, 846 A.2d 1020, 1034 (2004) (holding that the trial 
court’s admission of defendant’s statements, made in response to the  judge’s 
question, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir[,]” while 
defendant was not represented by counsel at an initial appearance, did not violate the 
Fifth or Sixth Amendments); Schmidt v. State, 60 Md. App. 86, 101, 481 A.2d 241, 
248-49 (1984) (upholding trial court’s admission of a defendant’s statement made at 
a bail review); Cowards v. Georgia, 465 S.E.2d 677, 679, (Ga. 1996) (holding that 
defendant’s statements made at bail review were properly admitted in trial); United 
States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237-39 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming a trial court’s 
admission of statements a defendant made during a “harangue” at his bail review); 
United States v. Melanson, 691 F.2d 579, 584 (1st Cir. 1981) (affirming a trial 
court’s admission of exculpatory statements a defendant made while unrepresented 
at a bail hearing, and remarking that “factors pertinent to the granting of bail, such as 
‘the nature and circumstances of the offense charged’ and ‘the weight of the 
evidence against the accused,’ see 18 U.S.C. § 3146, may inspire an accused to try to 
show, unadvisedly, that matters were different from what the government portrays, 
getting him into hot water as a result”).  See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 
523–24 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing attorney-client privilege and the waiver of that 
privilege when the defendant knows his telephone discussion with his lawyer is 
being recorded). 
177 See Poulin, supra note 155 at 1129–30.  
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advise him about the propriety or benefit of doing so.178  The defendant may 
feel emotional over the arguments or outcome of the hearing, and may 
express his disappointment in a way that reflects negatively on him.179  One 
of counsel’s tasks is to assist the defendant in presenting himself favorably; 
however, over a video connection, counsel can be of no help to her client in 
this task.   
     There is a clear deficiency within the system when an attorney cannot 
communicate with her client in confidence, and present the information he 
shares to the trier of fact.  If the Public Defender Act mandates 
representation at bail review hearings, that representation must comport with 
the rules of ethics.180 
 
B. Right of Defendant to be Physically Present 
 
     The right to presence has deep roots in English common law, where 
accused felons were traditionally denied the assistance of counsel.181  Denial 
of counsel gave a defendant’s right to presence “a position of even greater 
importance.”182  American courts did not adopt the English common law 
provision, as the concept of denying the accused representation was thought 
to be an “inherent irrationality of the English limitation.”183  The Fourth 
Circuit identified two prevalent rationales behind the defendant’s right to be 
present:  
 
(1) [A]ssuring nondisruptive defendants the opportunity to 
observe—and . . . to understand—all stages of the trial not 
involving purely legal matters generally incomprehensible to 
the layman in order to prevent the loss of confidence in 
178 Id. at 1130.  
179 “The risk, of course, is that if the defendant displays inappropriate behavior—any 
conduct not within the norm for the court—the court will evaluate the defendant 
negatively.  That negative evaluation can precipitate specific negative findings (that 
the defendant poses a risk to herself or others) or simply prompt the court to exercise 
discretion against the defendant.”  Id.  “[I]f the defendant feels compelled to respond 
to the prosecution’s allegations, but counsel believes it would be imprudent for the 
defendant to address the court, the physical separation between defendant and 
counsel will make it more difficult for counsel to calm and silence the defendant.” 
Id. at 1148 (footnotes omitted). 
180 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-209 (West 2008) (“Communications 
between an indigent individual and an individual in the Office or engaged by the 
Public Defender are protected by the attorney-client privilege to the same extent as 
though an attorney had been privately engaged.”). 
181 United States v. Gregorio, 497 F.2d 1253, 1257 (4th Cir. 1974), overruled on 
other grounds by United States v. Rolle, 204 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2000). 
182 Id. at 1258–59. 
183 Id. (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 306 (1973)). 
                                                                                                                             
 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 44.2 
 
88 
courts as instruments of justice . . . [and] (2) protecting the 
integrity and reliability of the trial mechanism by 
guaranteeing the defendant the opportunity to aid in his 
defense.184  
 
These rationales establish a framework for a fair and just trial, and the 
reasoning equally applies to physical presence in bail review hearings.185  
     Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure (“Rule 43”) governs 
when a defendant is required to be present in federal proceedings.186  The 
Fifth Circuit analyzed the plain meaning and context of Rule 43, concluding 
that “Rule 43(a) requires a defendant’s ‘presence’ . . . at all stages of trial.  
The rights protected by Rule 43 include the defendant’s constitutional 
Confrontation Clause and Due Process rights, and the common law right to 
be present.”187  
     The law has developed such that the right for the accused to be physically 
present at a pretrial proceeding is intertwined with his right to counsel.  The 
Maryland Rules also explicitly require that the “[p]ublic [d]efender shall 
provide representation to an eligible defendant at the initial appearance[,]”188 
184 Gregorio, 497 F.2d at 1258–59. 
185 “Because many of the defendants at first appearance proceedings are 
likely to be in an anxious, confused, or physically or mentally unwell state 
(especially if they have been abusing drugs or alcohol, or have been 
involved in a physical altercation), it is especially important for the judicial 
officers and others who interact with them to make sure that they 
understand what is happening.”  See NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. 
AGENCIES, supra note 10, (commentary to Standard 2.2(c)):  “At any 
pretrial detention hearing, defendants should have the right to: (i) be present 
. . . .”).  
186 See United States v. Lawrence, 248 F.3d 300 (4th Cir. 2001) (defendant had right 
to be present during sentencing, physically, not by CCTV, despite the fact that he 
had acted aggressively during court proceedings in the past).  See also United States 
v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999) (sentencing ought not take place unless the 
defendant is physically present, and the meaning of the word presence as used in 
Rule 43 is not satisfied by videoconference);  United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 
489 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (where the trial judge conducted a portion of voir dire at the 
bench, out of the defendant's hearing, defendant's exclusion from a portion of voir 
dire was harmless error; however, the court noted that a defendant's right to be 
present in order to assist counsel applied during voir dire). 
187 Navarro, 169 F.3d at 236. 
188 Md. R. 4-216(e)(2) (“Duty of Public Defender. Unless another attorney has 
entered an appearance or the defendant has waived the right to counsel for purposes 
of an initial appearance before a judge in accordance with this section, the Public 
Defender shall provide representation to an eligible defendant at the initial 
appearance.”). 
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and that the judge shall advise the defendant of that right.189  In Rothgery v. 
Gillespie County, the appellant, originally unrepresented, was arrested and 
charged with being a felon in possession of a gun, despite the fact that he had 
no prior criminal history.190  The court held the accused’s right to counsel 
attached at his initial appearance, and that states cannot unreasonably delay 
assigning representation to indigent defendants.191  
     In United States v. Wade, the Supreme Court of the Untied States 
construed the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to apply to critical stages192 
of the proceeding.193  While the Court has not explicitly held that a bail 
review hearing is a critical stage, counsel’s representation is eviscerated 
without his client.194  The accused is the center of the defense; for it is his 
experiences, his memories, and his life that are being discussed.  The hearing 
is a fluid process where information is conveyed quickly, and an attorney 
needs continuous input from his client.195  When counsel’s representation is 
required, together both he and the defendant must stand together before the 
court.  When counsel is not present, a defendant’s belief that he has no input 
in his own trial amplifies:    
 
Criminal defendants, especially minorities, often feel they 
are “outsiders” rather than participants in the adjudication of 
justice.  [They] may already distrust and feel intimidated by 
the criminal justice system, [and] CC[TV]provide[s] another 
bar to their full understanding of the proceedings and 
reinforce[s] their distrust of the system. CC[TV] only further 
magnif[ies] this distrust and alienation.196  
 
189 Md. R.4-216(e)(3)(A)(i) (stating that the judge at a bail review hearing shall 
advise the defendant that he has a right to an attorney at that proceeding). 
190 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191 (2008). 
191 Id. at 213. 
192 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (holding a post indictment lineup in 
the absence of counsel was a violation of the Sixth Amendment, in which counsel 
would remove any taint of unfairness), abrogated by Wood v. State, 196 Md. App. 
146, 7 A.3d 1115 (2010).   
193 “As early as Powell v. State of Alabama, supra we recognized that the period 
from arraignment to trial was ‘perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings,’ 
during which the accused ‘requires the guiding hand of counsel’ if the guarantee is 
not to prove an empty right.”  Wade, 388 U.S. at 225 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 54 (1932) (citations omitted)). 
194 See infra Part V.C.ii. 
195 Colbert, supra note 9 (“The [bail review] hearing took slightly more time when 
an attorney was present: on average, two minutes and thirty-seven seconds, versus 
one minute, forty-seven seconds without counsel.”). 
196 See Thaxton, supra note 20, at 197–98 (footnotes omitted). 
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     While the Constitution does not guarantee the defendant a right to be 
confident in his proceedings,197 the defendant’s inability to comprehend the 
bail review process is further strained by videoconference hearings.  The 
removal of safeguards, such as the right to counsel, furthers a defendant’s 
distrust in the process.198  A familiar admonishment to the defendant is, 
“[d]on’t speak because what you say is being recorded and will be used 
against you.”  This is good advice under the circumstances; the defendant is 
miles away from his counsel, and his words, if audible at all, will be heard by 
the judge and made part of the court record.199  The public defender collects 
extensive information from her client.  Pretrial Service’s proffer is not 
disclosed in advance of the CCTV hearing, however, so counsel is unable to 
communicate its contents to her client or to prepare a response to that proffer 
ahead of time.  For this reason, the attorney should be within a whisper’s 
distance during the hearing.200    
     A fair and just trial is kindled by an initial confidence vested in the 
pretrial stage.201  The use of technology must be restrained to ensure fairness 
197 United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 846 (4th Cir. 1995). 
198 See Thaxton, supra note 20, at 198 (“Keeping a defendant in her jail cell while 
her attorney is in the courtroom perpetuates a defendant’s distrust of her attorney.”). 
199 See Fenner v. State, 381 Md. 1, 27, 846 A.2d 1020, 1034 (2004) (holding that the 
trial court’s admission of defendant’s statements, made in response to the  judge’s 
question, “Is there anything you’d like to tell me about yourself, sir[,]” while 
defendant was not represented by counsel at an initial appearance, did not violate the 
Fifth or Sixth Amendments); Schmidt v. State, 60 Md. App. 86, 101, 481 A.2d 241, 
248-49 (1984) (upholding trial court’s admission of a defendant’s statement made at 
a bail review); Cowards v. Georgia, 465 S.E.2d 677, 679, (Ga. 1996) (holding that 
defendant’s statements made at bail review were properly admitted in trial); United 
States v. Ingraham, 832 F.2d 229, 237-39 (1st Cir. 1987) (affirming a trial court’s 
admission of statements a defendant made during a “harangue” at his bail review); 
United States v. Melanson, 691 F.2d 579, 584 (1st Cir. 1981) (affirming a trial 
court’s admission of exculpatory statements a defendant made while unrepresented 
at a bail hearing, and remarking that “factors pertinent to the granting of bail, such as 
‘the nature and circumstances of the offense charged’ and ‘the weight of the 
evidence against the accused,’ see 18 U.S.C. § 3146, may inspire an accused to try to 
show, unadvisedly, that matters were different from what the government portrays, 
getting him into hot water as a result”).  See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501, 
523–24 (4th Cir. 2008) (discussing attorney-client privilege and the waiver of that 
privilege when the defendant knows his telephone discussion with his lawyer is 
being recorded).  
200 The language of Rule 43 of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure demonstrates, 
implicitly, that initial physical presence must be required where the rules 
affirmatively indicate that a waiver of presence can be made.  United States v. 
Navarro, 169 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. 1999).  See also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 
(1970) (trial judges should allow attorney-client communication when defendant is 
excluded).  
201 See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).  
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for the accused.202  The right of the accused to be physically present before a 
judicial officer is deeply rooted in our system of fostering fair and just trials 
for all who face the possibility of incarceration.203 
     Character evidence is a form of propensity evidence that is not permitted 
during trial in order to prevent the jury from forming inferences of guilt 
against the accused.204  Bail review is the only time during the accused’s 
proceeding that his character and prior bad acts are discussed substantively.  
At bail review, the accused’s character is directly at issue, and his absence 
from the hearing prevents any opportunity to rebut representations made to 
the court.205  A defendant suffers a severe indignity by being subjected to a 
discussion about his past acts while he bears the scrutiny silently.         
     Maryland’s bail review hearings have adversarial components that cannot 
be avoided simply by labeling Pretrial Services a “neutral party.”  The 
charges presented against the accused contain evidence from the arresting 
police officer.  A police officer is not a neutral party, as his duty is to ferret 
out crime.  All too often, arresting officers have a motive to embellish on 
factual information to support an arrest.206  Law enforcement agents’ 
202 Adding an insightful analogy to our understanding of presence and the intention 
of the legislature, Justice Widener observes: “The problem presented here is at least 
as old as the trial of Walter Raleigh, who begged the court in vain to bring Lord 
Cobham from the Tower.  Sending the televised image of a witness from Butner to 
the City of Raleigh is no different than sending Cobham's writings from the Tower to 
Winchester.”  Baker, 45 F.3d at 850-51 (Widener, J., dissenting).  The case of Sir 
Walter Raleigh is more prevalent than ever as it reminds parties within the criminal 
justice system why formalities such as physical appearance were deliberately created 
and protected.  Any substitute for physical presence cannot be as meaningful.  
203 The Honorable Spottswood William Robinson III advocated for the defendant’s 
right to physical presence during the bail review stage, stating: “The trial court is not 
only the traditional but also the superior tribunal for the kind of information 
gathering which a sound foundation for a bail ruling almost inevitably requires.  For 
it is there that, at a hearing, the judge can come face-to-face with the primary 
informational sources, and probe for what is obscure, trap what is elusive, and settle 
what is controversial.”  United States v. Stanley, 469 F.2d 576, 581-82 (D.C. Cir. 
1972). 
204 Lester, supra note 154, at 35–36 (citations omitted) (“The rules of evidence 
themselves prohibit the practice of using past actions to prove future actions.  This 
certainly should not be a guiding principle when the future action has not and may 
never even occur.  A presumption of guilt accompanies a defendant instead of a 
presumption of innocence.  The presumption of guilt is not only for the charged 
crime but also for future crimes.”).  
205 Id. at 35 (“Basing future actions on mere allegations of prior indiscretions 
necessarily requires a substantive discussion regarding the validity of the alleged 
crime.  To have such a discussion at a point when discovery is minimal, and the 
availability of important witnesses is not required, places the defendant at a severe 
information disadvantage.”).  
206 See generally supra note 40. 
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representations are given great weight at bail review hearings, and go largely 
unchallenged because the defense has not been provided with discovery.207  
The accused’s presence is not only intertwined with his access to effective 
counsel, but also with his ability to challenge the probable cause 
determination by means of the Confrontation Clause.208  
 
C. Violation of Confrontation Clause 
 
     The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted the Confrontation 
Clause, with certain exceptions, to guarantee defendants a face-to-face 
meeting with witnesses appearing before the trier of fact.209  CCTV violates a 
defendant’s right to confrontation during a sentencing.210  The term “present” 
under Rule 43 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure means that, for the 
purposes of sentencing, a defendant must be at the same location as the 
judge.211  
207 “Basing future actions on mere allegations of prior indiscretions necessarily 
requires a substantive discussion regarding the validity of the alleged crime.  To 
have such a discussion at a point when discovery is minimal, and the availability of 
important witnesses is not required, places the defendant at a severe information 
disadvantage.”  Lester, supra note 154, at 35. 
208 A discussion of how CCTV violates the Confrontation Clause is included in a 
later section.  See infra Part V.C. 
209 Maryland v. Craig and Coy v. Iowa are relevant to the interpretation of the right 
of confrontation in the context of videoconferences in which a witness was given 
dispensation from personal appearance in court.  Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 
862 (1990); Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1012 (1988) (holding that under the 
Confrontation Clause, witnesses can not appear in trial by video unless case-specific 
findings are made as to why the witness can not be physically present).  In both, the 
child witness was given a pass on coming face-to-face with a defendant. The interest 
in protecting the complaining witness, due to precise findings of vulnerability, 
outweighed, in the Court’s reasoning, the defendant’s right to confront his accusers.  
In response to the Court’s decision in Maryland v. Craig, Justice Scalia wrote a 
strong-worded dissent, in which Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens joined.  
The four-justice opinion criticized the majority opinion that sanctioned Maryland’s 
procedure of allowing an alleged child victim of sexual abuse to testify in trial via 
CCTV.  Justice Scalia wrote, “the Confrontation Clause does not guarantee reliable 
evidence; it guarantees specific trial procedures that were thought to assure reliable 
evidence, undeniably among which was ‘face-to-face’ confrontation.” Craig, 497 
U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
210 United States v. Navarro, 169 F.3d 228, 236–37 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Craig, 497 
U.S. at 849).  In Navarro, the court held that sentencing by videoconference between 
judge and defendant violated rule requiring defendant's presence at sentencing.  Id.  
Presence was interpreted to describe the defendant’s physical presence in court.  Id. 
211 Navarro, 169 F.3d at 236-37 (citing Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 
(1994)).  See supra Part IV.A (detailing the argument regarding the interpretation of 
“presence.”).  
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     The Confrontation Clause does not guarantee the defendant absolute 
protection in a criminal trial, but it has some application to pretrial hearings, 
however limited, on a case-by-case basis.212  In order to determine whether 
the Confrontation Clause is germane to claims arising from pretrial hearings, 
lower courts have considered: whether the pretrial hearing is adversarial, 
whether excluding the defendant from the hearing interferes with his 
opportunity to challenge evidence presented against him, and whether the 
pre-trial proceeding is considered a critical stage.213  To establish the 
necessity for the Confrontation Clause’s safeguard in bail review hearings 
conducted through CCTV, this section will apply the various factors 
identified by lower courts. 
 
          i. Pretrial Services Present Adverse Evidence Against the Accused 
 
     The Pretrial Services’ representatives should present unbiased 
background information and provide an objective bail recommendation.214  
212 As Scalia explained, the right of confrontation explicitly provides for "face-to-
face" confrontation, but also guaranteed are “implied and collateral rights such as 
cross-examination, oath, and observation of demeanor. These are the specific trial 
procedures and ‘the purpose of this entire cluster of rights is to ensure the reliability 
of evidence.’”  Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
213 The right of a defendant to be present as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment is triggered “whenever his presence has a relation, reasonably 
substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.”  Snyder 
v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934), overruled in part by Malloy v. 
Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).  “Rather than analyzing how the right to confrontation 
applies to pretrial proceedings, the Court instead decided ‘it is more useful to 
consider whether excluding the defendant from the hearing interferes with his 
opportunity for effective cross-examination,’ and they found that it did not.”  
Christine Holst, The Confrontation Clause and Pretrial Hearings: A Due Process 
Solution, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1599, 1608 (2010) (the author analyzes various 
interpretations of precedent by lower courts to determine whether the Confrontation 
Clause applies to pretrial hearings) (citations omitted).  
214 See Barry Mahoney Et Al., Pretrial Services Programs: Responsibilities and 
Potential, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE ISSUES AND PRACTICES, 31-32 (2001), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/181939.pdf. 
 
Subjective risk assessments are based on program staff members’ 
consideration of the relative weight to be given to different factors.  
Objective risk assessments use instruments such as point scales or 
pretrial release guidelines that assign weights to variables such as 
nature and seriousness of the current charge, seriousness of prior 
record, employment status, housing situation, family ties, and the 
existence and nature of mental health or substance abuse problems. 
. . .  All three principal sets of national standards in the pretrial 
release field favor the use of objective criteria, principally on the 
grounds that they are fairer and more consistent. 
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The Pretrial Services representative provides information to the court about 
the alleged crime and the defendant’s life circumstances including 
employment, education, and residential details.  The representative lists any 
prior occasions during which a presiding judge issued a “failure to appear” 
warrant for a defendant.   The record of a failure to appear will be provided 
to the court regardless of the defendant’s reason for not being present in 
court.  To a first time bystander, Pretrial Services’ role may seem 
indistinguishable from that of the State’s Attorney, an adversarial party.215  
The judge gives great weight to Pretrial Services assessment of the accused’s 
likelihood to appear for trial and the risk he poses to public safety.   
     The Confrontation Clause is sometimes thought to apply only during 
hearings under oath.  Putting adverse witnesses under oath is a protection 
afforded to the defendant.  The oath is a safeguard against unfettered, 
dishonest testimony without repercussions.  Historically, it is made to God, 
and designed to evoke the scruples in a witness, as his lie would provoke an 
eternal consequence.216   
    Allowing extensive proffers while maintaining that the Confrontation 
Clause does not apply in the absence of an oath is an unfortunate 
misinterpretation of the purpose and meaning of the oath.  In his dissent in 
Maryland v. Craig, Justice Scalia made clear that the oath was not a 
prerequisite to the right of confrontation, but an additional safeguard against 
false accusation, along with the right of cross-examination: “If unconfronted 
testimony is admissible hearsay when the witness is unable to confront the 
defendant, then presumably there are other categories of admissible hearsay 
consisting of unsworn testimony when the witness is unable to risk perjury, 
un-cross-examined testimony when the witness is unable to undergo hostile 
questioning, etc.”217 
     Crawford v. Washington established that the Confrontation Clause applies 
to all statements that are testimonial or made with an expectation that they 
are to be used in court. 218  Certainly, the statements Pretrial Services delivers 
during bail review hearings are testimonial, and absence of the oath does not 
change that fact.  Therefore, the defendant should be afforded the right to be 
present in court to confront the Pretrial Services representative.   
     Shortly after the time of arrest, a commissioner determines probable cause 
by reviewing the arresting officer’s statement of charges.  Pretrial Services 
then furnishes the commissioner with a report, which will be considered at 
the defendant’s initial appearance.  Additionally, the report contains 
Id.   
215 This has been the experience of the Authors. 
216 Craig, 497 U.S. at 862 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
217Id. at 866.  
218 Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50-53 (2004) (holding unanimously that 
the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause applies equally to both in-court 
testimony and out-of-court statements). 
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information gathered during an interview of the accused by a Pretrial 
Services representative.  If a subsequent request for a bail review is filed in 
circuit court, the information that was initially gathered pursuant to the 
interview is used again by Pretrial Services, and the accused will not be 
interviewed again.  Counsel may provide updated information prior to the 
hearing; ultimately, however, the Pretrial Services representative will make 
extensive representations to the court regarding what family members said or 
left out.219  The Pretrial Services representative is not under oath and will not 
be subject to cross-examination by counsel.220  
     At a bail review hearing, the Pretrial Services representative will provide 
information, as an officer of the court, about the defendant.  Pretrial Services 
will use the charging document to make recommendations of bail, or denial 
of bail.  The defendant has a right under the Confrontation Clause to confront 
the witnesses against him, and virtual confrontation is not sufficient.  
Allowing unsworn, un-cross-examined testimony during a bail review 
hearing, when the defendant’s liberty interest is at stake, withers the rights of 
a defendant facing criminal charges.    
 
          ii. Excluding the Defendant from a Bail Review Hearing Interferes 
with his Opportunity for Effective Confrontation 
 
     The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees that 
“[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him....”  The Supreme Court of the 
United States has made clear that it “is the accused, not counsel, who must 
be ‘confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .’”221  During a CCTV bail 
review hearing in circuit court, the accused may hear the statements made by 
Pretrial Services over the video feed.  The Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
defendant a right to confront, not to listen.  Though the accused may be in 
the same room as the Pretrial Services representative during a CCTV bail 
review hearing in district court, he is unable to directly provide information 
to his attorney in confidence as Pretrial Services states its findings.  In both 
scenarios, the defendant is stifled by the inability to contest inaccurate 
statements.   
     By making representations to the court about the defendant’s criminal 
history, perceived risk of flight, and dangerousness to society,222 the 
219 See generally, NAT’L ASS’N OF PRETRIAL SERV. AGENCIES, supra note 10, at 59-
60. 
220 Id. at 13. 
221 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 816 (1975) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment grants the defendant the right to make his own defense). 
222 Md. R. 4-216(f)(1) (Maryland Rules provide a detailed list of “factors” to be 
considered at a bail review.  In Baltimore City, an Assistant State’s Attorney and an 
agent from the Pretrial Services Division of the Department of Public Safety 
provides extensive information.).  See also 18 U.S.C. § 3142 (2008).  
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prosecutor and Pretrial Services’ representative essentially become witnesses 
against the defendant.223  The defendant is neither able to confront the 
prosecutor, nor the representative during a video conference bail hearing. 
 
D. Violation of Right to Due Process of Law 
 
No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his 
rights or possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of 
his standing in any other way, nor will we proceed with 
force against him, or send others to do so, except by the 
lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of the land.224  
 
     In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court established a three prong balancing test 
to determine those “procedural safeguards due a person whose interests are 
to be adversely affected by government actions.”225  Courts should consider 
the following factors: 
 
(1) The private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, 
if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and 
(3) the government's interest, including the function 
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute procedural requirements would 
entail.226 
 
     The Due Process Clause is used as a prism to reveal the rights guaranteed 
to a criminal defendant in protection of his liberty.  Thus, the issue that 
CCTV generates is one of constitutional dimension: Whether the defendant’s 
223 See Poulin, supra note 1555, at 1148 (noting that “the prosecution and defense 
may present conflicting information” at a bail review hearing, and “[i]f the defendant 
is not in court, the defendant will be hampered . . . in assisting counsel to change the 
facts presented”).  See also Thaxton, supra note 20, at 188 (“[B]y making 
representations to the court as to the defendant's criminal history, perceived risk of 
flight, and dangerousness to society, the prosecutor becomes a witness that the 
defendant is unable to confront due to the use of [CCTV].”). 
224 MAGNA CARTA, Cl. 39 (1215), referenced in, A.E. DICK HOWARD, TEXT AND 
COMMENTARY, MAGNA CARTA (1964). 
225 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976) (holding that the plaintiff 
satisfied the first prong of its test, acknowledging that the receipt of benefits was an 
important private interest—plaintiff accused the federal government of terminating 
his Social Security disability benefits without an evidentiary hearing prior to 
termination). 
226 Id. 
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presence at the bail review hearing would reduce the risk of an erroneous 
deprivation of liberty? 
 
          i. Private Interests Affected by CCTV 
 
     The accused has an interest in liberty pending trial.  It follows that he also 
has an interest in a bail determination that is based upon a full and fair 
portrayal of his character and ties to the community. 227  Meaningful 
assistance of counsel is crucial to a fair hearing.  The defendant’s ability to 
obtain a fair bail determination is also dependent on the opportunity to 
effectively confront the adverse evidence presented against him.228 
     Presence allows for the procedural safeguards that are absent in CCTV 
hearings.  Because counsel cannot effectively advocate for his client if the 
accused is not by his side, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel cannot be 
fulfilled without the accused’s physical presence.   Counsel cannot 
effectively advocate for his client if the accused is not by his side.  As 
discussed above, the right to counsel and defendant’s physical presence at 
the hearing are interdependent.  Baltimore City affords indigent defendants 
the right to counsel during the bail review stage, but with CCTV, this right is 
hollow.  The Maryland Legislature recognized the importance of 
representation during this stage, which is why the right to counsel during the 
bail review stage survived after DeWolfe I.229  Moreover, the adversarial 
components of bail review necessitate the guidance of counsel, and the 
counselor’s need to obtain input from her client at any time during the bail 
review hearing.   
     Individualized justice is lost at the bail review hearing when the accused 
is physically removed from the courtroom.  The presumption of innocence is 
“the undoubted law, axiomatic and elementary, and its enforcement lies at 
the foundation of the administration of our criminal law.”230  Where is the 
presumption of innocence when the accused is banished from the courthouse 
227 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 760 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“If 
excessive bail is imposed the defendant stays in jail.”). 
228 In Maryland, the preliminary hearing, which is controlled by Maryland Rule 4-
221, generally occurs before a district court judge.  This hearing is a “critical stage” 
of the criminal process, within the meaning of Coleman v. Alabama, to determine 
whether there is probable cause to require the defendant to stand trial on the charges. 
399 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1970).  See also Green v. State, 286 Md. 692, 695, 410 A.2d 234, 
235 (1980); Hebron v. State, 13 Md. App. 134, 151 n.2, 281 A.2d 547, 556 n.2 
(1971). 
229 Public Defender Act, MD CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 16-204(b)(2)(i). 
230 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 763 (citing Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 
(1895)). 
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and is depicted in a jail surrounding?231  Video bail dehumanizes an 
individual who is presumed innocent.232 
     The defendant’s interest in liberty triggers a due process 
analysis.  Unfavorable bail determinations lead to the deprivation of liberty.  
When a video bail hearing’s removal of necessary procedural safeguards, 
revolving around physical presence, is the cause of an individual’s 
deprivation of liberty, that deprivation is erroneous.  The accused is not 
afforded his right to counsel when he is removed from counsel’s side.  He is 
denied his right to confront adverse evidence and witnesses when he is 
absent from the courtroom, where the information is being conveyed to the 
judge.  He loses his presumption of innocence when he is depicted, not only 
in prison garb, but inside the jail.233  Without presence, the accused is not 
afforded his full spectrum of rights. 
 
          ii. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of Liberty 
 
     The second prong of the Eldridge test assesses the risk of the possibility 
that a person will be mistakenly deprived of their private interests because of 
the lack of additional or different procedural safeguards.234  Generally, if the 
231 “It is clear that the presumption of innocence must be maintained in the eyes of a 
jury.  But a judicial officer is just as susceptible to bias as a juror.  A judicial officer 
may be more vulnerable to the risk of implied bias based on the mere status of the 
defendant.  A juror may only hear a handful of cases, but a judicial officer will hear 
thousands.”  Lester, supra note 154, at 9–10 (citations omitted).  See also John 
Tierney, Do You Suffer from Decision Fatigue?,  N.Y.  TIMES: MAGAZINE (Aug. 17, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-
fatigue.html?_r=3&scp=1&sq=willpower&st=cse&. 
232 Lester, supra note 154, at 6 (“For the presumption to have its full meaning, it 
must apply at all stages of the judicial process.”).  See generally Escobedo v. Illinois, 
378 U.S. 478, 490-91 (1964) (holding that the right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment to the Constitution, made applicable to the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, requires counsel to be present when requested by 
the defendant during all critical stages of the proceedings, including, but not limited 
to, pretrial interrogations). 
233 See generally Lester, supra note 154, at 54 (explaining how the courts must 
consider the defendant’s due process rights in all stages of the criminal proceedings, 
including bail review hearings). 
234 In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Court ruled that the administrative procedures in 
place did not violate the plaintiff’s due process rights.  The plaintiff was offered 
several methods to address the termination of benefits, but did not choose to employ 
them.  424 U.S. 319, 346 (1976).  However, in Goldberg v. Kelly, the Court held that 
the governmental interest in conserving administrative costs were not sufficient to 
override public aid recipients’ interest in procedural due process, even though the 
procedures did not permit recipients to present evidence, be heard in person or 
through counsel, or to confront adverse witnesses.  397 U.S. 254, 268 (1970).  The 
Eldridge Court distinguished Goldberg, saying the crucial factor in Goldberg was 
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risk of error is minimal, the need for additional procedures diminish.  In the 
alternative, if the risk is high, then additional procedures would be merited.   
     Videoconference systems disproportionately affect indigent defendants, 
and there has been no significant effort made by the state to address or 
remedy the disparate impact.  As discussed above, jails are filled with 
individuals deep in poverty.235  Indigent individuals accused of a crime 
should be situated in a manner similar to that of wealthy individuals accused 
of the same crime; however, their outcomes differ substantially.  Rarely does 
an affluent individual remain in Central Booking long enough to have a bail 
review hearing; thus, CCTV disproportionately affects indigent defendants.  
The CCTV images of detainees in a jail setting place a stigma against 
indigent defendants, that their only identity is that of a criminal.  Indigent 
defendants often cannot afford the bail amounts set by commissioners, but 
indigency alone does not make them deserving of a sub-par form of justice.   
     Each defendant’s demeanor is different, each judge’s perception varies, 
and never has a video system’s transmission been ideal.  The risk of error in 
a video bail review hearing is not minimal.  Where the defendant is 
physically absent, there is a significant risk that the defendant’s liberty will 
be erroneously deprived during a bail review hearing.  To avoid the risk of 
wrongfully depriving the accused of his liberty before being found guilty, 
pretrial incarceration should be the last resort.  
 
          iii. Governmental Interests 
 
     The third prong of the Eldridge test scrutinizes the government’s 
interests.236  The Eldridge Court made clear that when the procedure at issue 
was created to alleviate administrative burdens, then a court considers 
whether the need for “enhanced due process” is merited by the need to assure 
individuals that administrative actions are procedurally just.237  
Administrative costs should not be considered if enhanced due process is 
merited.  However, if the costs of the additional procedures outweigh the 
benefits, then the government should not be required to use additional 
resources. 
that welfare recipients are in dire need and assistance is only given to persons on the 
very margin of subsistence, whereas eligibility for social security disability is not 
based on financial need.  The Eldridge Court also recognized an additional factor 
that adds dimension to its analysis:the fairness and reliability of existing procedures, 
and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards.  Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 
340.  Goldberg held that access to financial aid that sustains ones ability to obtain 
food and shelter are quintessential elements of human survival.  Goldberg, 397 U.S. 
at 364.  
235  See generally Walsh supra note 9 and accompanying text.    
236 Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335.  
237 Id. at 348. 
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     The administrative costs associated with conducting video bail review 
hearings should not be given any weight.  CCTV deprives the accused of 
essential safeguards, which assist him in obtaining a favorable bail 
determination.  Enhanced due process (i.e., allowing a non-disruptive 
defendant to be physically present) is required to eliminate the risk of 
generating a disparate impact on the impoverished. 
     In United States v. Salerno, the Court evaluated the constitutionality of 
the Bail Reform Act of 1984.238  The Bail Reform Act requires “courts to 
detain[,] prior to trial[,] arrestees charged with certain serious felonies if the 
Government demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence after an 
adversary hearing that no release conditions ‘will reasonably assure… the 
safety of any other person and the community.’”239   
     Regarding the respondent’s Eighth Amendment claim, the Salerno Court 
concluded, “Where Congress has mandated detention on the basis of some 
other compelling interest—here, the public safety—the Eighth Amendment 
does not require release on bail.”240  Justice Rehnquist’s opinion reasons that 
the Eighth Amendment “has never been thought to accord a right to bail in 
all cases, but merely to provide that bail shall not be excessive in those cases 
where it is proper to grant bail.”241     
     The respondent in Salerno argued that pretrial detention of the sort 
contemplated in the Bail Reform Act required substantive due process; 
however, the Court disagreed, holding that procedural due process was all 
that was required.242  The Court reasoned that the Bail Reform Act’s aim was 
regulatory in nature, as it was designed to prevent crimes committed by those 
released on bail, and not to punish those held in pretrial detention.243  
238 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 741 (1987). 
239 Id. at 739 (emphasis added).  
240 Id. at 740 (emphasis added).  
241 Id. at 754 (quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952)). 
242 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 752.  The respondent also unsuccessfully argued that The 
Bail Reform Act violated the Eighth Amendment.  The Salerno Court stated, “Where 
Congress has mandated detention on the basis of some other compelling interest—
here, the public safety—the Eighth Amendment does not require release on bail.”  Id. 
at 740.  Justice Rehnquist’s opinion reasoned that the Eighth Amendment “has never 
been thought to accord a right to bail in all cases, but merely to provide that bail 
shall not be excessive in those cases where it is proper to grant bail.”  Id. at 754 
(quoting Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 545 (1952)).   
243 Justice Rehnquist’s argument has been called into question, as Justice Marshall 
points out: “The absurdity of this conclusion arises, of course, from the majority’s 
cramped concept of substantive due process.  The majority proceeds as though the 
only substantive right protected by the Due Process Clause is a right to be free from 
punishment before conviction.  The majority's technique for infringing this right is 
simple: merely redefine any measure which is claimed to be punishment as 
‘regulation,’ and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its imposition.”  
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 760 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Justice Marshall also comments 
on the majority’s logic in denying the claim to substantive due process on the 
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     The Court explained that a compelling governmental interest may 
outweigh an individual’s liberty interest, stating, “[f]or example, in times of 
war or insurrection, when society's interest is at its peak, the Government 
may detain individuals whom the Government believes to be dangerous.”244  
Salerno set the benchmark for compelling governmental interests in the 
context of bail review.245  A reasonable inference can be made that the state’s 
purported interests in replacing live bail review hearings with video 
broadcasts include promoting administrative convenience, save 
transportation costs and security fees, and reduce the danger of harms 
associated with the transportation process.  On the other hand, the 
defendant’s liberty interest is fundamental, and not easily outweighed.246  
     Maryland Rule 4-231(b) mandates that a “defendant is entitled to be 
physically present in person at a preliminary hearing and every stage of the 
trial.”247  In applying the Salerno standard, the exception carved out for 
video bail in Rule 4-231(d) deprives defendants of procedural safeguards.248  
The government’s interest in conducting CCTV bail hearings is neither 
compelling nor narrowly tailored.  The risk of erroneous deprivation of 
liberty runs high when the accused is not present at his own hearing.   
     Presumably the state is interested in fostering efficiency.  Efficiency is 
generally met by harmonizing quantity and quality.  However, the state is 
employing procedures that focus on the quantity, not the quality of hearings.  
Proponents of CCTV allege that videoconference systems are a step in the 
right direction to meeting the Riverside standard.249  However, the state’s 
rationale for utilizing CCTV is not prompt presentment, but convenience and 
brevity.  CCTV bail hearings have not brought Baltimore City any closer to 
grounds of an Eight Amendment violation for excessive bail, stating: “The Eighth 
Amendment, as the majority notes, states that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be required.’ 
The majority then declares, as if it were undeniable, that: ‘This Clause, of course, 
says nothing about whether bail shall be available at all.’  If excessive bail is imposed 
the defendant stays in jail.  The same result is achieved if bail is denied altogether.  
Whether the magistrate sets bail at $1 billion or refuses to set bail at all, the 
consequences are indistinguishable.” Id. at 760–61 (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).  See also Lester, supra note 154, at 32–33 
(citations omitted) (“The Salerno majority did not dispute the premise that 
punishment with less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt is unconstitutional; it 
merely found that the detainment set forth pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3142 was not 
punishment, but a regulation.  The Salerno court thus indirectly recognized this idea 
when it characterized pretrial detention as regulatory rather than punitive since it 
would be unconstitutional to punish with the limited proof offered at a pretrial 
detention hearing.”). 
244 Salerno, 481 U.S. at 748. 
245 Id. at 739. 
246 Id. at 750.  
247 Md. R. 4-231(b). 
248 Md. R. 4-231(d). 
249 See Cnty. of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991). 
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satisfying the Riverside benchmark, requiring the initial appearance be held 
within 48 hours of detention.250  
     In United States v. Baker, the Fourth Circuit noted that “the goal of a 
criminal proceeding is to uncover the truth by examining rigorously the 
reliability of conflicting evidence presented and then engaging in extensive 
fact-finding.  The rights of cross-examination and confrontation, as well as 
the right to effective assistance of counsel, are all directed toward this 
goal.”251  Quality is not produced by enhanced television resolution, but by 
effective counsel and the right to confrontation.  Quality is promoted by the 
safeguards that prevent the government from turning an individualized 
hearing into a dehumanizing, hurried cattle call.  Due Process demands that 
indigent defendants are present, in the flesh, at bail review hearings, as their 
liberty interests outweigh the government’s interest in alleviating 
administrative burdens. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
     Studies from the Cook County and Asylum hearings demonstrate the 
consequences of videoconference bail review hearings for the accused.252  As 
discussed above, the defendant’s presence is critical.  Physical presence adds 
integrity to the pretrial proceeding, and is the foundation upon which a 
defendant’s constitutional rights, ensuring a fair and just trial, are based.  If 
the accused is not present, assistance of counsel cannot be effective and 
confrontation is not possible.  Judges making bail determinations should 
consider that there are months, and potentially years, of pretrial incarceration 
at stake for each defendant. 253  When making these important decisions that 
so profoundly affect people’s lives, the accused’s humanity is a critical 
factor.  Their families, jobs, rental payments, health considerations, and 
human need for freedom, comfort, and privacy are all relevant to a judge’s 
250 See id.; Ian Duncan, Lost in Jail, Defendants Wait Weeks for Chance at Freedom, 
THE BALT. SUN (Mar 16, 2014), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-03-
15/news/bs-md-forgotten-in-jail-20140315_1_brewer-defendants-prosecutors. 
251 United States v. Baker, 45 F.3d 837, 844 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Maryland v. 
Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The central concern of the Confrontation Clause 
is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a criminal defendant by subjecting 
it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceeding before the trier of 
fact.”)).  
252 See Seidman Diamond, supra note 91 at 898. See also Walsh & Walsh, supra 
note 81, at 271. 
253 Mason v. Cnty. of Cook, 488 F.Supp. 2d 761, 765 (2007) (denying the motion to 
dismiss Plaintiff’s Sixth Amendment and Due Process claims, remarking that bail “is 
important to anyone charged with an offense—there are days, weeks, or even months 
of incarceration at stake[—and i]f Plaintiff or others are denied bail because of 
unconstitutional procedures, they may be entitled to the equitable relief they seek 
here”). 
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decision.  By excluding an accused from his own bail hearing, his humanity 
and dignity are forgotten, as he is out of sight and out of mind.  Bail amounts 
reflect the imbalance. The accusation and the defendant’s criminal history 
should not be the only factors a judge considers in reaching a bail 
determination.  There is a person on the other side of the camera who 
deserves to breathe the same air as the judge deciding his fate.  
     Videoconferencing affected Mr. Johnson’s outcome.  Constitutional 
safeguards, inherent in live bail review hearings, arguably made the 
difference between Mr. Gibson receiving a favorable bail determination and 
Mr. Johnson remaining incarcerated pending trial.  The Sixth Amendment 
rights to counsel and confrontation are intended to protect liberty, and are not 
designed for the convenience of the state.   
     Pretrial incarceration has reached astronomical levels nationally.  
Baltimore City, out of the twenty cities with the largest jails, locks up the 
largest percentage of its population in the country.254  Ninety percent of those 
in the Baltimore jail complex are awaiting trial, and therefore are presumed 
innocent until proven guilty.255  Bail review hearings test the presumption of 
innocence after Salerno and that presumption needs championing.256   
     Videoconference bail review hearings are one brick in the wall around the 
jail, which, according to recent data collection and scholarship by professors 
from Northwestern University, result in 51% higher bail amounts than their 
live counterparts.257  Many jurisdictions face some form of automated 
justice, which tends to dehumanize the accused.  The trend towards the 
integration of CCTV in criminal proceedings raises an important issue 
concerning the proper balancing of judicial efficiency and a criminal 
defendant’s constitutional rights.  This article seeks to give a voice to 
indigent defendants who have become disproportionately subject to a subpar 
process.    
     In DeWolfe v. Richmond, Maryland’s highest court affirmed the guarantee 
of counsel for indigent defendants during bail review hearings.258  However, 
the Maryland Rules authorize the use of CCTV during such proceedings 
when held in district court, but not in circuit court.259 Therefore, in the 
district court context, the holding in DeWolfe I and the Maryland Rules act in 
opposition to each other.  This opposition exists because the use of video in 
an adversarial hearing deprives the defendant of his right to counsel and 
confrontation. 
     It is expected that criminal procedure will make technological advances, 
but these advances must operate to increase efficiency without sacrificing 
254 See Walsh, supra note 9, at 1. 
255 Id. at 9. 
256 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 766 (1987).  
257 See Seidman Diamond, supra note 91, at 892. 
258 DeWolfe v. Richmond, 434 Md. 403, 439, 76 A.3d 962, 983 (2012). 
259 See Md. R. 4-231. 
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fairness.  The core concerns that go to the heart of fair and just criminal 
proceedings and human dignity are being increasingly overlooked as 
technology advances.  CCTV leaves accused individuals without 
constitutional safeguards and makes them vulnerable to an erroneous 
deprivation of liberty, which uproots the organization of their lives and 
negatively affects trial outcomes.  As Bryan Stevenson correctly stated: 
 
We will ultimately not be judged by our technology, we 
won’t be judged by our design, we won’t be judged by our 
intellect and reason.  Ultimately, you judge the character of a 
society, not by how they treat their rich and the powerful and 
the privileged, but how they treat the poor, the condemned, 
the incarcerated.260 
 
     CCTV bail reviews strip away the rights and liberty interests of accused 
individuals only to further administrative convenience.  Sustaining all 
constitutional safeguards in a meaningful way will ensure fairness and 
integrity, recognizing the humanity of the accused and their inalienable right 
to liberty.  
 
260 Bryan Stevenson, We Need to Talk About an Injustice, TED TALKS (March 2012), 
http://www.ted.com/talks/bryan_stevenson_we_need_to_talk_about_an_injustice.ht
ml.  Addressing the Supreme Court of the United States, Abe Fortas summed it up 
best during oral argument in Gideon v. Wainwright: 
 
I do believe that in some of this Court's decisions there has been a 
tendency from time to time, because of the pull of federalism, to 
forget, to forget the realities of what happens downstairs, of what 
happens to these poor, miserable, indigent people when they are 
arrested and they are brought into the jail and they are questioned 
and later on they are brought in these strange and awesome 
circumstances before a magistrate, and then later on they are 
brought before a court; and there, Clarence Earl Gideon, defend 
yourself.   
 
Oral Arg. Tr. at 4, Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).  
                                                                                                                             
